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Résumé
La mémoire implicite est révélée par des tâches indirectes (par exemple, l’amorçage)
qui ne nécessitent pas de récupération consciente. L’amorçage constitue une
augmentation de l’efficacité de traitement d’un stimulus ou d’un concept suite à une
exposition au même stimulus ou concept. L’amorçage d’identité trans-forme (AITF)
est un paradigme dans lequel seule la nature conceptuelle du stimulus est répétée
entre les phases d’étude et de test. À ce titre, cette forme d’amorçage est liée à la
mémoire implicite conceptuelle.
Motivés par une perspective évolutionniste, nous avons utilisé un paradigme d’AITF
(amorçage des mots par des images) dans le but d’évaluer si certaines variables ayant
des effets sur la mémoire explicite et la mémoire sémantique ont également des effets
sur la mémoire implicite. En se basant sur les atteintes catégorielles sémantiques
observées de façon sélective chez certains patients cérébrolésés, nous avons comparé,
dans l’Étude #l, l’AITf pour des items appartenant aux catégories objets “vivants” et
“non-vivants”. D’autre part, le rappel en mémoire à long terme semble meilleur pour
les stimuli ou évènements chargés érnotionellement. Dans l’Étude #2 nous avons
investigué si la charge émotionnelle exerce un impact sur l’AITf. Enfin, dans
l’Étude #3, nous avons investigué le substrat neuronal de l’AITF subliminal en
utilisant l’imagerie fonctionnelle par résonance magnétique (IRMf).
iv
L’Étude #1 a démontré que les items vivants amènent un effet d’AITf plus important.
Ce résultat est en accord avec l’hypothèse selon laquelle les items appartenant à la
catégorie “vivants” sont traités de façon spéciale par le système sémantique. Une
interprétation de cet effet est que les items de la catégorie “vivants” sont traités de
façon plus profonde, peut-être à cause de leur importance au point de vue émotionnel.
L’Étude #2 a démontré un effet d’AITF plus important pour les items émotionnels
négatifs que pour les items émotionnels positifs ou neutres. Nous avons interprété cet
effet comme étant le résultat d’un traitement plus profond car les items émotionnels
négatifs constituent des possibilités de menace à la survie des humains. L’Étude #3 a
révélé un effet d’AITF subliminal significatif. Sur le plan comportemental, les
résultats renforcent l’hypothèse voulant que les stimuli perçus de façon inconsciente
sont également traités de façon profonde. Les résultats obtenus à l’aide de l’IRMf ont
démontré que des aires corticales (cortex occipitotemporal bilatéral, gyrus temporal
antéro-supérieur) impliquées au niveau de la mémoire sémantique jouent un rôle dans
l’AITf subliminal. Les résultats de ces trois articles renforcent au niveau théorique
les perspectives «activationnelles » de la mémoire implicite.
Mots-clefs: subliminal, forme, amorçage conceptuel, domaine sémantique, saillance
émotionnelle, LRMf.
VSummary
Implicit memory is revealed by indirect (i.e., priming) tests which do flot necessitate
effortflil retrieval. In priming, an increase in processing efficiency is measured for a
previously encountered stimulus or concept. hi cross-form identity priming (CFIP),
stimulus form is varied from study to test. CFIP reflects conceptual implicit memory
because only the conceptual identity denoted by the stimulus is repeated between
prime and target.
Motivated by an evolutionary perspective, we used a CFIP paradigm (picture-to-word
priming) to investigate whether variables known to impact on explicit and semantic
memory would also impact on the strength of implicit memory. Based on findings of
category-specific semantic memory impairments recorded among brain-damaged
patients, in Study #l, we examined whether items from the domain of living things
would show greater CFIP than nonliving items. A separate une of research has
shown that long-term memory is enhanced for emotionally salient events or stimuli.
In light of this data, we investigated, in Study #2, whether emotional salience would
impact on the magnitude of CFIP. Finally, in Study #3, we investigated the neural
underpinnings of subliminal CFIP using fMRI.
Study #1 revealed that items belonging to the “living” category led to greater CFIP.
This finding is in une with the assumption that the semantic system is particularly
tuned to the identification and processing of “living” things. One interpretation of
vi
this effect is that the living items were more deeply processed, possibly because of
their increased emotional salience. Study #2 revealed greater CFIP for emotionally
negative versus emotionally neutral or positive stimuli. We posit that this difference
may be related to spontaneously deeper processing for negative items because they
are more likely to conjure real-world items or situations which could be dangerous to
the observer. Study #3 found significant subliminal CFIP in a paradigm which
eliminates the risk of contamination by explicit memory. Behavioral resuits boister
daims that unconsciously perceived stimuli can be deeply processed. FMRI results
reveal that areas known to be involved in semantic processing (bilateral
occipitotemporal and the lefi anterior superior temporal cortex) play a role in
subliminal CFIP. Theoretically, our CFIP results support activational accounts of
priming.
Keywords: subliminal, cross-form, conceptual, priming, semantic domain, emotional
salience, fMRT
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1Chapter 1: General Introduction
2“It is reasonable to assume ... that priming represents a ubiquitous occurrence in
everyday life” (Tulving and Schacter, 1990)
Introduction
Over the past five decades or so, various unes of research have converged to reveal
that memory is flot a unitary phenomenon (Schacter, 1992a; Schacter et al., 1993).
Whereas the function of memory is undoubtedly one of enabling organisms to more
efficiently navigate their environment by, among other things, leaming from
mistakes, flot ail forms of memory do so in the same way. One clear division is
between impÏicit (or nondeclarative) memory and explicit (or declarative) memory
(Grafand Schacter, 1985; Squire, 1982; Squire, 1994; Tulving and Donaldson, 1972).
In tests of explicit memory, direct reference is made to a leaming episode and a
conscious effort to recail (or to recognize) an event or stimulus is required. In
contrast, implicit memory is revealed by indirect tests which do flot necessitate the
conscious or effortful recollection of a previous experience (Graf et al., 1984;
Schacter, 1995).
The phenomenon of priming is often used to study implicit mernory. Priming can be
defined as an increase in processing efficiency for a previously encountered stimulus
or concept (Bower, 1996; Cofer, 1967; Cramer, 1966; Gabrieli, 199$; Schacter,
1992a; Shimamura, 1986; Tulving and Schacter, 1990). Typically, a studied
stimulus, the “prime” is repeatedly presented, and becomes the “target” when a
response is required. Within the priming literature, a distinction lias been made
3between repetition (or “identity”) and semantic (or “associative”) priming (Neeiy,
1991). The difference between these two forms of priming lies in the relationship
between the prime and the target. In semantic priming, a relationship such as
category membership, conceptual relatedness, or semantic association exists between
the prime and the target. For example, when the word “cat” primes the word “dog”,
the two words are semanticaiiy related because both are animais, both are pets, and
further, they tend to occur together (Fischler, 1977). Eariy on, Meyer and
Schvaneveldt (1971) demonstrated that when two such semantically reiated words are
presented together in a double lexical decision paradigm (the task being to decide
whether both words are real), they are responded to more rapidly than when the
words are unrelated (e.g., “nurse” and “butter”). Semantic priming research has
underpinned network theories of semantic knowledge, and support the notion that
related concepts are iinked in an associative semantic network (Chang, 1986; Collins
andLoflus, 1975).
In repetition priming, instead of priming taking place between two related concepts,
the prime and target are identical. In the case of perceptual priming, the structural
characteristics of the stimuli are not changed between study and test (Gabrieli et al.,
1994). An example of a paradigm that evaluates this form of priming is the
“tachistoscopic identification” task. In this task, afier having been exposed to words
in the study phase, subjects are instnicted to identify very briefly presented words in
the test phase. Priming is revealed to the extent that words encountered in the study
phase are more easily identified in the test phase (Jacoby and Dallas, 1981; Jacoby,
1983). The priming demonstrated by such tasks is deemed to be perceptual because
4study manipulations that affect explicit memory retrieval, such as depth-of
processing, have littie or no effect on priming, and because study-test manipulations
of the structural characteristics of the stimuli (such as changes in font) tend to reduce
priming but have no effect on explicit retrieval (e.g., Blaxton, 1989; Graf and Ryan,
1990).
Tachistoscopic presentation has also been used to measure subliminal priming. The
motivation for this branch of research is the fact that in most investigations, primes
are presented explicitly, making it difficult to rule out the behavioral effects of
explicit memory since subjects may spontaneously use explicit remembering of
studied items in the supposedly implicit test phase. Ibis simation, commonly
referred to as contamination, has been discussed elsewhere (Bar and Biederman,
199$; Beauregard et al., 1997; Beauregard et al., 1999; Merikie and Reingold, 1991).
Research lias shown that subliminal priming may 5e used to circumvent possible
contamination by rendering primes unconsciously perceivable. In subliminal
priming, primes are presented below the level of conscious awareness, although their
influence can nevertheless be measured later on (Evett and Humphreys, 1981; Forster
and Davis, 1984; Schacter, 1992a). Bar and Biederman (1998), for example, recently
demonstrated that subliminal exposure to pictured objects leads to subsequent
facilitation in the processing of those objects in a tachistoscopic identification
paradigm. Subliminal priming, therefore, shows that even when a stimulus is flot
consciously perceived, it can stiil have an effect on subsequent processing of the
same stimulus. One question which lias arisen, however, regards the extent to which
unconsciously perceived stimuli are nevertheless deeply processed One of tlie
5earliest studies suggesting that relatively deep processing can occur was performed
by Marcel (1983), who showed that subliminal exposure to a word can speed the
processing of a semantically related word. This issue is discussed in more detail in
Study #3.
Although we have seen that repetition priming is ofien perceptually based, this needs
flot always be the case. Jndeed, repetition priming can also be conceptual in nature.
Such conceptual repetition priming may occur when the structural characteristics of
stimuli are transformed between study and test. In cross-form priming, for example,
a word is studied and then repeated in a new font, or a picture may be studied and a
word may be presented at test. While removing the perceptual component often
compromises the strength of the priming effect (e.g., Roediger et al., 1989),
significant priming can nevertheless be demonstrated. In this case, because the only
repetition between the prime and the target is one of identity (i.e., the concept
denoted by the stimulus), a processing advantage at test must reflect enhanced
conceptual processing efficiency (Hirshman et al., 1990). Jndeed, some repetition
priming paradigms are considered to reflect relatively pure forms of conceptual
implicit memory (Dell’Acqua and Grainger, 1999; Moscovitch, 1992; Roediger and
McDermott, 1993; Vaidya et al., 1997).
To capitalize on the conceptual processing advantage which is gamered by this
repetition, most studies which have examined cross-form priming have used
relatively conceptual tests such as speeded category membership or lexical decision,
as opposed to perceptual tests such as tachistoscopic identification. These sorts of
6tests are oflen used because response times (RTs) are hypothesized to be proportional
to the cognitive load expended on the task (e.g., Rubenstein et al., 1971). In Vriezen
et al. (1995), for example, category membership decisions to pictures were speeded
by having previously made the same decisions to word forms of the very same
concepts. Henceforth, priming between two differing forms of the same concept will
be referred to as cross-form identity pnming (CFIP).
In the current body of work, we have made exclusive use of CFW in order to distiil
conceptual priming down to its essential. Rather than using some form of
conditioning or relying on pre-existing relationships between concepts stored in
semantic memory (as in semantic priming), we were interested in evaluating how
variables endogenous to the to-be-remembered stimuli themselves would impact on
the magnitude of CFIP. The motivation for this research question is discussed in
detail below. First, however, a brief review of theoretical accounts of repetition
priming is warranted. Because we were also interested in exploring the neural
substrate of CFIP, a brief overview of the neural substrate subserving priming is
presented.
Models of priming
Much research and theorizing has been undertaken in order to account for the
cognitive nature of priming, and a brief review of theories pertinent to repetition
priming is presented in the next section. Because the present work is concemed with
7repetition priming, a detailed discussion of semantic priming is beyond its purview
(for an in-depth review see Neeiy, 1991). What follows is a brief survey of
theoretical modeis proposed to account for implicit memory phenomena.
There are a variety of models which have been presented to account for repetition
priming. One of the earliest, the multiple memory systems view, posits that the sum
of memory phenomena can be divided across a number of dissociable systems
(Nadel, 1994; Schacter, 1992a; Schacter, 19925; Squire, 1992; Squire, 1994; Tulving
and Schacter, 1990). In Tuiving and Schacter’s (1990) influential view, four types of
memory systems exist: one procedural, one semantic, one priming, and one episodic.
Procedural memory is said to refer to the changes in skiiÏ performance that corne with
practice. It is thouglit to underlie the skiiis that are acquired when, for example,
leaming a new sport. Semantic memory refers to ail the general knowÏedge that is
shared by a culture (i.e., the knowledge that Elvis is dead). Episodic memoiy is
comprised of ail the personal mernories that one has of experiences that they
thernselves have lived through. Tulving and Schacter (1990) account for repetition
priming by proposing the existence of a pre-sernantic “perceptual representation
system” (PRS) which operates independently of episodic memory. Priming in this
perspective is considered to exclusively engage perceptual processing (Schacter,
1992b). This view came largeÏy from findings showing that changes in the structural
properties of the stimuli between study and test diminish the magnitude of repetition
priming, whereas such changes have littie effect on classic tests of semantic priming
which themselves are typically sensitive to “level of processing” manipulations
(Craik and Lockhart, 1972; Graf et al., 1985; Jacoby and Dallas, 1981; Jacoby and
8Hayman, 1987; Masson, 1986; Roediger and Blaxton, 1987; Tulving and Schacter,
1990). The fact, however, that priming can be found in the absence of repetition of
perceptual information has prompted the elaboration of varying interpretations.
The modular memory approach assumes that the mechanisms that underlie cognition
(and memory) are divided into input modules and central systems (Fodor, 1983;
Fodor, 1985; Moscovitch, 1992; Nadel, 1994). In this system, modules are highly
information-type specific (e.g., an auditory input module) and are impervious to
penetration by higher-order cognitive processes, whereas central systems can
combine information from various modules and lead to conscious perception. The
modal model accounts for repetition priming by proposing that both input modules
and central (semantic) systems share the property of maintenance of information, and
that identical (and related) stimuli are more efficiently processed upon repeated
presentation.
Activational views, which have arisen from theoretical work on the nature of the
storage of semantic information, contend that the presentation of a prime activates a
lexical or conceptual node in a semantic network and that this activation is
maintained long enough to facilitate subsequent processing of the same (or a related)
concept (Chang, 1986; Collins and Lofius, 1975; Collins and Quillian, 1969;
Mandler, 1980; McClelland and Rumeihart, 1981; McNamara, 1 992a; McNamara,
1992b; Morton, 1969). The activational perspective is discussed in more detail in the
Discussion section.
9Finally, the position that ail memory phenomena (even implicit memory phenomena)
are episodic in nature has also been proposed to account for repetition priming. In
this view, it is argued that a memory trace is perpetuated after exposure to
information and this memory trace is exploited when the target is presented (Jacoby,
1983; Ratcliffand McKoon, 1988; Roediger and Blaxton, 1987).
Functional Neuroanatomy
Varying forms of memory are oflen assumed to be subsewed by (at least partially)
dissociable brain structures (for a detailed account see Zola-Morgan and Squire,
1993). Because amnesic patients tend to show largely presewed priming and gravely
impaired explicit memory, it is assumed that priming relies on neural structures
outside of the medial temporal lobe and diencephalon (since ablation of these
structures provokes anterograde amnesia) (Scoville and Mimer, 1957; but see
Beauregard et al., 199$; Jemigan and Ostergaard, 1993; Ostergaard, 1999; Ostergaard
and Jemigan, 1993 for arguments against this conclusion). Bothneuropsychological
and neuroimaging evidence points to occipitotemporal cortex as playing an important
role in perceptual priming (Buckner et al., 199$; Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000;
Fleischman et al., 1995; Gabrieli et al., 1994; Grafand Ryan, 1990; Schacter, 1992b).
More oflen than flot, a decrease in regional cerebral blood flow or blood-oxygen
level-dependent (BOLD) signal response is recorded in relation to increased
efficiency in the processing of primed items. On a neuronal level, this increased
efficiency is termed “repetition suppression” (RS) and suggests that decreased
10
resources are necessary to process previously processed items (Ungerleider, 1995;
Wiggs and Martin, 1998). Evidence further suggests that brain areas subserving
conceptual priming include temporal and frontal associations areas (Demb et al.,
1995; Dhond et al., 2001; Fleischman et aÏ., 1995; Gabrieli et al., 1994; Gabrieli et
al., 1996; Martin and Chao, 2001; Wagner et al., 2000; Yasuno et al., 2000). Further
detail regarding the neural substrate of priming is presented in Study #3.
Evolutionary Perspective
The next section wilÏ discuss priming from an evolutionary standpoint. Evolutionary
psychology is an approach to psychology which attempts to understand the human
mmd (and brain) in the context of evolutionary pressures. In this perspective “the
mmd is a set of information-processing machines that were designed by natural
selection” (Cosmides and Tooby, 1997). In the evolutionary psychological
perspective, we speculate that the capacity for repetition priming may have been
primordially important to human survival across millennia of evolution. The author
ftilly acknowledges that it is impossible to directly test any hypothesis with respect to
evolution since any behavior expressed by modem humans must have been selected
for or else it would flot exist. Indeed, the evolutionary perspective can be accused of
being circular in this regard. Nevertheless, this perspective was used as a starting
point to generate specific hypotheses with respect to variables which may affect the
strength of CFIP. A brief review of the background context of the evolutionary
perspective is presented in the following paragraphs.
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Darwin’s (1859) (and Spencer’s) theory of evolution makes four basic daims: first,
living entities within a species must compete for limited resources in order to survive;
second, naturaÏ variations will occur across members of that species; third, those
entities which are better able to compete will survive; and finally, those entities which
survive will pass on to their progeny the very trait which helped them to survive.
How can repetition priming be seen to play a role in this process? To put it simply,
by improving behavior and the chances of reproductive success. Let me illustrate
here by example: we begin with perceptual priming. In perceptual priming, previous
exposure to an object facilitates subsequent perception of that object. Let us imagine
that the object in question is a well-camouflaged Gaboon viper. Picture an early
Homo sapien walking through the equatorial Affican ram forest. He fails to notice an
aptly camouftaged Gaboon viper (hidden amongst the fallen leaves) until his almost
steps on it. The snake begins to hiss and the ram forest wanderer; appropriately
scared (Gaboon vipers are extremely venomous; time to death —15 minutes),
immediately makes off to rejoin the others back at the compound. Research in
perceptual priming suggests that the next time the wanderer is off in the ram forest,
the camouflaged snake will be more easily perceived, and the wanderer will
drastically reduce his chances ofbeing attacked.
This example clearly illustrates how perceptual priming (of a well camouflaged
snake) might Iead to reduced chance of death (by snake bite), and ultimately to
irnproved reproductive success. in other words, perceptual priming can be seen as a
fundamental mechanism of leaming and by extension, of survival. This analysis
12
bears a striking similarity to LeDoux ‘s (1996, 2000) conception of fear conditioning
(Figure 1). According to Ledoux, emotional memory (i.e., fear conditioning) is
implicit because no conscious reference to a leaming episode is necessary in order to
trigger a Ieamed response. Ledoux makes the case that such unconscious effects of
previous experience on current behavior are mediated by the amygdala and its neural
connections. Further, because the amygdala has been shown to play a crucial role in
fear conditioning across a wide variety of organisms, Ledoux considers such a system
to be of immense survival value and suggests that this ability was selected for and
preserved across evolution. The scope of the current postulate, however, is greater
than Ledoux’s conception because ail repetition priming phenomena are included (flot
just fear conditioning). Fear conditioning, in this perspective, is simply one easily
measured example ofthe unconscious effect ofpast experience on future behavior.
In conceptual repetition priming, previous exposure to any concept in one forrn leads
to improved processing ofthe same concept, even in a varying form. To illustrate by
retuming to the above example, perhaps the equatorial wanderer would have more
easiÏy perceived the snake the first time around if he had recently had a conversation
about snakes in general, or the Gaboon viper in particular (even if he did flot
explicitly remember the conversation). In such a case, a verbally processed concept
would lead to an increased efficiency of processing the very object denoted by that
concept.
According to Ledoux (1996), the amygdaloid fear system is hypothesized to work
independently of the cortex and is thought to be evolutionarily very old. It is
13
reasonable to assume, however, that as the brain deveioped across mammalian
evolution, the principles of this form of leaming were incorporated into the ever
developing cortex. Because the functional purpose of ail memory is maintenance of
information, the capacity for perceptuai, and uitimately conceptuai, repetition priming
is most iikely the resuit of such incorporation. Indeed, there is speculation that the
underlying molecular mechanisms of ail forms of leaming are similar (Abel and
Lattai, 2001; Izquierdo and McGaugh, 2000; McEachem and Shaw, 1999). further,
there is some evidence that while repetition priming is mediated by posterior cortical
areas (in the occipitotemporal lobes), conceptual priming also involves more antenor
areas which are generally considered to have developed more recently in human
evolution (Deacon, 1990).
Whule the current position is that the fundamental function of ail forms of memory is
to aid in the survival of the species, it is impossible to directly examine whether the
capacity for priming in general, or CFIP in particular, are the resuit of this process.
The only method at our disposai in order to address this fascinating question is that of
inference. The model proposed by Cosmides and Tooby (1997) clearly illustrates this
principle (Figure 2). According to Cosmides and Tooby (1997), we must first
understand the adaptive problem. In this case, the adaptive problem is one of quickly
and efficiently processing meaningftil extemal stimuli. Next, we must investigate the
way in which the mmd solves these problems. These questions are considered in
terms of variables which potentiate CFLP which is investigated in Studies #1 and #2.
Finaliy, we must examine the neurai substrate ofthese cognitive processes. This final
question is investigated in Study #3.
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This thesis has endeavored to examine certain variables which can be seen to impact,
from an evolutionary perspective, on repetition priming. Two variables which can be
seen as having survival value are also known to interact with the long-term storage of
information (both explicit recail and semantic knowledge): the ability to beiler
remember emotionally salient events (relative to emotionally neutral ones), and the
purported existence of a specialized system for the semantic representation of living
versus nonliving things. In this thesis we first examined whether living and nonliving
things would prime in equal magnitudes. There have been many documented cases
of category-specific semantic impairment, with the domain of living things being
more frequently impaired (Bunn et al., 1998; Caramazza et al., 1982; Caramazza and
Shelton, 1998; Laiacona and Capitani, 2001; Montanes et al., 1996; Moss and Tyler,
2000; Tranel et al., 1997; Warrington and McCarthy, 1983; Warrington and Shallice,
1984). A number of perspectives have been proposed to account for these findings,
although one in particular is based on an evolutionary perspective. Caramazza and
Shelton (1998) have suggested that, evolutionarily speaking, the semantic system first
evolved for the rapid classification of living things, and that the rest of the semantic
system was built around this base. If this is true, then living things hold a vital place
in the processing of extemal stimuli. We saw this premise as a logical place to begin
our research, and thus the first question which we sought to answer was whether
living and nonliving concepts would yield equal amounts of CFJP. We reasoned that
in our study, differences in the magnitude of priming for living and nonliving
concepts would reflect their differing status (and prominence) in semantic memory.
In une with Caramazza and Shelton (199$), we predicted that greater priming would
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be found for living things because, across evolution, living things were fundamentally
important to the survival of the human organism and the capacity for priming is a
direct resuit of the evolutionary process. Study #1, Category Differences in Cross
form Priming, which employed a relatively pure CFIP paradigm, was conducted to
test this hypothesis.
Subsequently, we wondered whether a role for emotional salience (and by
consequence, arousal) may be found in the strength of implicit memory. We
therefore sought to evaluate whether the variable of emotional salience (operationally
defined as emotional valence) would increase the magnitude of identity priming.
Many studies have shown that emotional salience has an impact on explicit memory
(Blake et al., 2001; Bradley et al., 1992; Brown and Kulik, 1977; Cahiil and
McGaugh, 1995; Christianson and Faellman, 1991; Christianson and Loftus, 1987;
Christianson and Safer, 1996; Dewhurst and Parry, 2000; Doerksen and Shimamura,
2001; Finkenauer et al., 199$; Hamami et al., 1999; Maratos et al., 2000). Some of
this research has pointed to a greater potentiation of memory by negative items or
events, relative to positive or neutral items or events. Akin to this line ofresearch, in
Study #2, Negative Valence Potentiates Repetition Priming, we hypothesized that
negatively valenced images (presented together with their respective words) would
lead to increased priming.
Finally, we were interested in leaming more about brain areas which might be
involved in CFJP. A further goal of this research was to use our findings of
subliminal CFP to inform theoretical accounts of repetition priming, and hence of
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implicit memory. In Study #3, Neural Substrate of Subliminal Cross-Form
Priming, we sought to better understand the neurological underpinnings of CFIP.
Here we were motivated by the perspective that both phylogenetically older and
newer areas of the cerebral cortex which are known to subserve semantic processing
would participate in CFIP.
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Abstract
Findings of category-specific impairments have suggested that human semantic
memory may be organized around a living/nonliving dichotomy. In order to assess
implicit memory performance for living and nonhiving concepts, one group of
neurologically intact individuals participated in a cross-form conceptual priming
paradigm. In block 1, pictures primed words while in block 2 words were used to
prime pictures. Across ail phases of the experiment, subjects decided whether items
represented something which was living or nonliving, and response times were
recorded. Resuits revealed greater priming for living concepts across both blocks.
Greater priming for living concepts may have occurred because of increased or
prolonged conceptual activation of these concepts. Results are discussed in the
context of theoretical accounts of the category-specific impairments observed in
brain-damaged populations.
Keywords:
Priming, category-specificity, living, nonliving
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Introduction
The finding that some patients with focal brain lesions exhibit semantic deficits
which are limited to one particular semantic category lends support to the possibility
that semantic knowledge is stored in functionally dissociable brain systems
(Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Forde & Humphreys, 1999; McKenna & Warrington,
1978; Moss & Tyler, 2000; Shelton et al., 1998; Warrington & McCarthy, 1983).
More ofien than not, category-specific semantic deficits affect the general domain of
living things.
Theoretical accounts of category-specific semantic deficits fali into two broad
classes: those which posit the existence of (independent) multiple semantic stores and
those that do not. Unitary semantics theories argue that category effects are
“artifactual” in that tliey reflect the influence of extraneous variables such as concept
familiarity, usage frequency, or stimulus complexity1, but do not reflect any
functional or anatomical division within the semantic system. Multiple semantics
perspectives posit that there may be separate stores of information, with at least
partially dissociable underlying brain systems responsible for the representation of
various categories ofknowledge.
J Complexity refers to the visual attributes ofa picture. For exampie, the silhouette
ofa car would befar less complex than a regular picture ofa car
— which would
contain much more visitai information and visitai objects (Le., antenna, door
handies, windows etc
...).
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The multiple semantics theory which has received the most attention to date considers
that semantic lmowledge is divided across a sensory/functional division (the
sensory/functional theory — or SfT; Warrington & McCarthy, 1983; Warrington &
Shallice, 1984; see also Hart and Gordon, 1992). Warrington and colleagues (1983,
1984) have suggested that a “sensory” or “visual” semantic system stores information
about an object’s structure (its form — its color etc...), whereas a “functional” system
stores information about an object’s function (what it’s for — what it does etc...).
According to Warrington and Shallice (1984), living concepts may be selectively
impaired because information about living things relies more heavily on visual
information stored in the sensory system. They further propose that it is particularly
this system which is most oflen damaged in cases of category-specific semantic
impairment. The SFT has, however, been critiqued by Caramazza and Shelton
(1998) on logical and experimental grounds which demonstrate that the
sensory/functional distinction does not apply uniformly across categories of
knowledge in patients with category-specffic impairments.
One defense of the unitary semantics position is the proposal that an interaction
between the variables of structural similarity and semantic proximity leads to
apparent category-specific impairments. The daim is that living things resemble
each other more closely (that is — they share many highly inter-correlated features)
than nonliving things — both on a structural (sensory) and a semantic level
(Humphreys et al., 1988). In this view, difficulty in naming living items occurs
because living items are relatively harder to disambiguate from each other (Dixon et
al., 1999; Forde & Humphreys, 1999). Whereas Dixon and colleagues (1999) have
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supported this position using abstract computer generated forms, Caramazza and
Shelton (199$) have pointed out that this situation shouid iead to naming impairments
for tools (which tend to resembie each other) as oflen as it does for animais or fruits
and vegetables, which is flot the case. McRae and Cree (2002) contend that a given
concept may be associated with a pattem of activation among a set of features which
themselves couid be segregated in semantic space. The Organized Unitary Content
Hypothesis (OUCH) proposed by Caramazza et al. (1990) stipulates that because
properties that define living objects are highly inter-correlated, these properties are
“ciumped” together (i.e., semantic space is “iumpy”), with the densest regions
occupied by properties corresponding to living things. In ail of these conceptions,
brain damage is more likely to iead to a deficit for living things because their
properties are more highly inter-correlated and stored together.
To elucidate whether artifactuai variables account for apparent category-specific
semantic impairments, researchers have tested brain-damaged patients on semantic
memory tests (usually picture naming) while holding constant such variables as
stimulus frequency and compiexity, which can affect how easiiy a picture can be
named (Bunn et al., 199$; Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Forde & Humphreys, 1999;
funneil & Sheridan 1992; Kurbat & Farah, 199$). Although the resuits of such
studies are not unequivocai, the existence in some brain-damaged patients of
category-specific deficits even under conditions of strict stimulus control tends to
support the view that living and nonliving concepts are treated differentially within
the semantic system. Importantiy, this une of research has underscored the
importance of strict variable controi in investigations of category-specificity.
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Further support for an anatomical basis of category-specificity has been found in
functional brain imaging studies conducted among normal subjects (Martin et al.,
1996; Moore & Price, 1999; Perani et al., 1995). Data has been accumulated using
techniques including event-related potentials (ERP), positron emission tomography
(PET), and ftmctional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). An early picture
matching PET study by Perani et al. (1995), for example, found that animal
recognition was associated with bilateral inferior temporal cortex activation while
nonhiving objects differentially activated the lefi dorsolateral frontal cortex.
Reinforcement of the notion of dissociable brain areas underlying semantic
knowledge for living and nonliving items was taken to the level of the individual
neuron by Kreiman et al. (2000) who implanted intracranial depth electrodes into the
brains of epileptic patients. Their investigation revealed that a percentage of
individual neurons in the medial temporal lobe responded selectively and exclusively
to individual categories (i.e., faces, houses, animals) ofpictured objects.
Although functional neuroimaging studies have tended to support the multiple
semantics perspective, disagreement between just which areas are involved in the
processing of living versus nonliving things have lefi questions about the nature of
this division unresolved (Chao et al., 1999; Kreiman et al., 2000; Mummery et al.,
1998; Perani et al., 1999). Furthermore, some studies have suggested that apparent
category-specific activations may actually be reflecting the influence of artifactual
variables (e.g., Gerlach et al., 2000; Moore & Price, 1999). Similarly, others have
interpreted findings of category-specific activations as reflecting the distribution of
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feature processing modules which are selectively activated by members of particular
categories (e.g., Ishai et al., 2000). finally, a number of studies have failed to find
category-specific effects (e.g., Deviin et al., 2002).
To account for neuropsychological and functional brain imaging data which lias
upheld the possibility of dissociable brain regions involved in category-specific
effects, Caramazza and Shelton (199$) have proposed a multiple semantics “Domain
specific” hypothesis (DSH). They propose the existence of at least partially
“dedicated neuronal circuits for processing animals and plant life” and suggest that
this system may have developed because living things were primordially important to
human survival to the extent that they represent sources of comestible or lethal food,
medicinal compounds, or dangerous threats. They further proposed that because of
this special status, living things may be more emotionally salient that nonliving
things. In accordance with the common finding of superior (explicit) memory
performance for emotionally salient stimuli (Cahill & McGaugh, 1995; Christianson
& Faelleman 1991; Christianson & Safer, 1996; Colombel, 2001; Danion et al., 1995;
Dewhurst & Parry 2000; Doerksen & Shimamura, 2001; Kitayama, 1996; Labar &
Phelps, 199$; Palomba et al., 1997; Phelps et al., 1997), the notion that living things
may promote improved implicit memory receives initial plausibility.
In light of the above review, we were interested in determining the strength of
conceptual repetition priming for living and nonliving items. In conceptual priming
the concept denoted by a studied stimulus is repeated at test, and this repetition yields
more efficient conceptual processing of the studied concept (Blaxton, 1989; Brown &
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Mitchell, 1994; Carlesimo, 1994; Graf & Ryan, 1990; Schacter, 1987; Schacter &
Buckner, 199$; Sperber et al., 1979). Activational theories ofpriming interpret such
resuits as indicating that exposure to a stimulus provokes activation of that concept in
the semantic network, leading to more efficient processing upon subsequent
presentations (Bower 1986, 1996; Collins and Lofius, 1975, Morton, 1969; Paivio,
1986). According to Paivio’s (1986) “dual code hypothesis”, for example, concepts
are stored in two parallel systems in the brain: one (visual) system contains
“imagens,” which are pictorial representations of objects, whereas the other (verbal)
system contains “logogens”. Both logogens and imagens are individual conceptual
representations of objects (i.e., conceptual nodes). In Paivio’s system, activation of a
logogen spreads to its respective imagen and vice versa (Paivio & Begg, 1981).
km the current study, we used a cross-form conceptual repetition priming paradigm to
compare the magnitude of priming for living and nonliving concepts. This was
chosen as a way to eliminate carry-over of perceptual information from study list to
the test list (Vanderwart, 1984). Specifically, a picture-to-word (and word-to-picture)
priming paradigm was used. In line with Paivio’s dual code hypothesis, conceptual
priming was predicted using this paradigm. Specifically, it was hypothesized that (1)
the semantic activation of a concept would yield reduced response times on a
subsequent task that required a conceptual appraisal of the same concept (even when
the two presentations of the concept were in different forms i.e., pictures or words);
and that (2) greater priming would be found for items belonging to the category of
living things. This second hypothesis was motivated by the DSH and its contention
of increased emotional salience for living things. It was reasoned that this increased
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emotional salience would lead to greater study-phase semantic activation of living as
opposed to nonliving concepts.
Meth ods
Generally, studies which have examined cross-form priming have found significant
priming effects, although the effects are typically smaller than those usually found in
within-form priming (Thompson-Schill & Gabrieli, 1999; Weldon et al., 1995).
Nevertheless, we were interested in determining whether living and nonliving
concepts would show equal priming in a relatively pure conceptual irnplicit memory
paradigm. An attempt was made to match living and nonliving items as closely as
possible for variables such as frequency (a measure of how often one cornes into
contact with a particular concept in every day life), word length, and pictorial
complexity (which tends to be higher for living versus nonliving things) which have
all been assumed to play a role in category effects in previous studies (see Kurbat &
Farah, 1998).
Subjects
Thirty-two normal right-handed francophone subjects (17 females; average age
23.3, range 20-40, sd = 4.8; 15 males; average age = 24.8, range = 1$-35, sd = 4.6)
with neither neurological nor psychiatric history voluntarily participated in this study.
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French was the dominant language used by ail participants. Each subject signed a
consent form and received five dollars for their participation.
Materials
Ah stimuli were presented on an Apple Macintosh computer running the Psychlab
software (Bub & Gum, 1988). The stimulus items were either pictures taken from the
Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) set or their French lexical counterparts (see Table
1). Each stimulus item denoted a concept which belonged either to the category of
living things (animals, or fruits and vegetables) or nonliving things (clothing,
household objects, tools, or vehicles).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Procedure
One experiment was conducted to test for the cross-form priming of living and
nonliving concepts. Block PW tested for picture-to-word priming, while block WP
tested for word-to-picture priming. The order of blocks was counterbalanced across
subjects. The study phases of both blocks consisted of the presentation of living and
nonhiving primes, while the test phases contained four groups of stimuli; living and
nonliving targets (repeated from study), and living and nonliving distractors (new
unstudied items). Thus, for exampie, subjects may have seen the picture prime of a
dog in the study phase and responded to the target word “dog” in the test phase. The
order of stimulus presentation was always (pseudo) randomized with the condition
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that no more than 3 items from the same category (livinglnonliving) appeared on
successive trials. There was no overlap between items used in the two blocks.
During the study and the test phases ofboth blocks, subjects were instructed to decide
if the stimulus denoted something which was natural or man-made. The
experimenter provided an example such as “the word or picture could be of an
orange, which would be naturally occurring, or a table, which would be man-made”.
Subjects revealed their choices by pressing on one oftwo keys on the keyboard, using
their index and adjacent middle finger of their right hand for responding. Keys used
were counterbalanced as to category; that is, the left-hand key was used as often as
the right-hand key to represent living things. The computer recorded response times
(RTs), i.e., the latency to key-press following the onset of each stimulus. The
presentation parameters for each stimulus in both the study and testing phases were as
foÏÏows: a fixation point was presented for 500 ms followed by a blank screen for 500
ms which in tum was followed by the presentation ofthe experimental stimulus itself.
Each experimental stimulus disappeared when the subject pressed a key. On average,
study pictures remained on the screen for 660 ms, and study words remained on the
screen for 682 ms. The disappearance of the stimulus was followed by a 500 ms
pause after which the fixation point was again presented. Thus, the average inter
stimulus interval was 1500 ms. Study items were presented in blocks, and each study
block was directly followed by a test phase. No mention was made as to the eventual
repetition of studied items. Informal post-experimental interviewing revealed that
most subjects believed that the purpose ofthe test was to see how quickly they could
classify words as compared to pictures.
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Sixteen picture primes were presented in the study phase of block PW (see Table 2).
Haif of these pictures denoted objects which belonged to the category of living
things, and haif denoted objects which belonged to the category of nonliving things.
Study phase nonliving pictures had significantly higher familiarity ratings than study
phase living pictures (t(7) p <0.05). Study phase living and nonliving pictures did
flot differ with respect to stimulus complexity. During the test phase, 32 words were
presented. Test phase target and distractor words did flot differ significantly from
each other in terms of length. According to the “Bnilex” French word norms, test
phase words had a mean usage ftequency rating of 3 06.5, which is considered to be
medium (Content et al., 1990). Usage frequencies did flot differ significantly
between living and nonliving words or between distractor and target words within
each category.
During the study phase ofblock WP, 16 words were presented (see Table 2). Half of
these words denoted obj ects which belonged to the category of living things, and the
other haif denoted objects belonging to the category ofnonliving things. Study living
and nonliving words did not differ significantly with respect to frequency or number
of letters. During the test phase, 32 pictures were presented. Whereas living
concepts were significantly less familiar than nonliving concepts, (t(15) p < 0.05),
complexity did not vary significantly. Importantly, target and distractor items were
matched for both familiarity and complexity and did not differ significantly on these
measures.
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Across both blocks, the important variable of age of acquisition2 did flot vary between
living and nonliving items.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Data analysis
The data were analyzed as follows. Responses to the first item in the test phase were
eliminated in order for the subj ects to acclimate to the task. For each subj ect, the
average RTs to each of the four stimulus types were computed for test phase items.
Errors were eliminated from the analysis, as were any RTs which were more than 3
standard deviations from the mean of each subject’s overail average RT. Removed
data were lefi void; i.e., the data were not replaced.
Pre-experimental control
Twelve normal right-handed francophone subjects (7 male, mean age = 25. 1, range
18 to 41, sd = 7.8) participated in a pilot study designed to establish that no baseline
differences in RTs were found when no priming had taken place. The instructions
given to these volunteers were identical to those given to the research subjects who
participated in the experiment. Since these subjects were flot exposed to the primes
(i.e., they did not participate in the study phases), the averages oftheir RTs were used
2 Age of acquisition data taken from Alario & Ferrand (1999).
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to create groups of stimulus lists for the experiment. Student’s T-tests revealed that
no significant differences in RTs for sets of stimuli to be used as targets and
distractors in the experimental task were found (ail t-tests: t(7) p 0.86).
Resuits
A three factor (prime status, category, block) mixed ANOVA performed on all test-
phase RTs was carried out (see Figure 1). The analysis confirmed an overali main
effect ofpriming (F1, 31 = 32, p <0.0001), reflecting the fact that subjects responded
more quickly to targets (613 ms sd = 90.6) than to distractors (63$ ms sd = 102). A
main effect was also found for block (F1, 31 = 7.1, p = 0.012), reflecting the fact that
subjects responded more quickÏy to test pictures (613 ms sd = 103) than to test words
(63$ ms sd = 90). The analysis aiso revealed that RTs were faster to living (613 ms
sd = $9) than nonliving items (63$ ms sd = 103) (F1,31 = 10.6, p < 0.005) across both
blocks (block PW: living = 630 ms, nonliving = 647 ms; block WP: living = 596 ms
nonliving = 630 ms). Finally, an interaction was observed between category and
prime status (F1, 31 = 15.25, p = 0.0005). Decomposition ofthis effect revealed that
significant priming occurred for living things (F1, = 61.8, p < 0.0001), whereas
there was no significant difference between RTs to nonliving target and distractor
items. ftideed, averaged across both blocks, the priming percentage3 was much
3 The formula is ((distTactor RTs — target RTs)/disfractor RTs) * 100).
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greater for living items (6.1%) as compared to nonliving items (1.3%). Importantly,
this pattem was repeated in both biocks. A three-way interaction was flot observed.
To further confirm these resuits, an analysis was mn on average RTs to each stimulus
across ail subjects. Although the power of this test is significantly less than that of
the “by subject” ANOVA (because each “group” now contains only $ items) the three
main effects were replicated. Specifically, this ANOVA revealed that subjects
responded faster to pictures than to words (F1, 7 = 5.83, p <0.05), to living versus
nonliving items (F1, = 7.95, p = 0.026), and to targets relative to distractors (F1, $ =
59.2, p < 0.0001). The interaction observed between category and prime status failed
to reach significance on this test.
Finally, an analysis of errors made in the categorization task failed to reveal any
significant differences between living and nonliving items. Nor were there many
errors committed (average of 0.6 errors per subject across both blocks). In contrast,
more errors were recorded when subjects responded to pictures (average of 0.38
errors per subject) than when subjects responded to words (0.2 1 errors per subject).
[Insert figure 1 about here]
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Discussion
This study compared cross-form priming for living and nonliving concepts in a group
of young, normal subjects. Block PW demonstrated that overali priming took place
when pictures primed words, while block WP revealed similar effects when words
primed pictures. Analysis across both blocks revealed greater priming for living
concepts as compared to nonliving concepts. The critical finding of this study is that
the magnitude of conceptual priming differed significantly as a function of semantic
category: greater priming for living as compared to nonliving concepts was found
regardless ofwhether pictures primed words or words primed pictures.
The current implicit memory paradigm might be criticized for its inherent potential
for contamination by explicit memory strategies. There are reasons to believe,
however, that the resuits reported here reflect implicit memory retrieval devoid of
such contamination. Although the subjects undoubtedly noticed that the paradigm
included the repetition of items, they were naïve as to the real purpose of the study.
ftideed, given that the subjects were asked to respond as quickly as possible to all
stimuli, it would seem unreasonable to assume that they would purposely and
explicitly recall a previously encountered concept in order to respond to the stimulus
with which they were faced (Vriezen et al., 1995). Also, previous studies have found
an advantage for the recail ofpictures over words in explicit memory tasks but not for
implicit memory tasks (Paivio & Csapo, 1973; Stenberg et al., 1995; but see Vaidya
& Gabrieli, 2000). Because we did flot find improved memory when pictures primed
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words relative to when words primed pictures, it is unlikely that explicit memory
played a role in our resuits.
Before interpreting the results, it is important to be confident that they reflect the
operation of implicit memory and flot the influence of extraneous variables which
could have influenced Ris including the frequency and complexity of target stimuli.
In both blocks, test phase target items did flot differ from distractor items in terms of
familiarity or complexity. hi block PW there was no difference between the number
of letters of target versus distractor living words. Distractor nonliving words,
however, were an average of haif a letter shorter than target nonliving words. This
minimal difference, however, could flot reasonably be expected to negate any priming
which might have otherwise been evident if the target and distractor nonliving word
lists were more closely matched for word length. Further, even when no such
difference existed in the target items in block WP, much greater priming was still
found for living as compared to nonliving items. Finally, it is important to note that
the stimuli used in the current paradigm were first mn on subjects who were not
primed. Thus, any baseline differences in RTs to these items (which could result
from these variables) were eliminated in the process of preparing the test phase
stimulus groups. Clearly then, the variables of familiarity, complexity, frequency,
and word length alone can not account for the significant priming evidenced for
living concepts or the lack ofpriming observed among nonliving items.
A number of variables in this experiment would have led to the prediction of greater
priming among nonliving concepts. First, it has been observed that slower RTs in
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semantic priming paradigms usually lead to greater observed priming (Neely, 199l).
In the current study, resuits from both blocks revealed that subjects responded more
quickly to living items. This was even true in block WP in which nonliving test
phase items had higher familiarity ratings. As such, these quicker RTs could have
been expected to lead to a reduction in measured priming. A second factor which
could have led to the prediction of greater priming for living things is a direct
conclusion of featural theories of semantic category effects. That is, if living things
are more highly inter-correlated than nonliving things, and in line with the notion of
semantic spreading of activation, it could be argued that activation of study phase
living concepts would spread to supposedly distractor living items in the test phase
more so than for nonliving things (which supposedly share less features in common),
thereby reducing obsenred priming for living things (Collins & Lofius, 1975; Dixon
et al., 1999; McRae & Cree, 2002). Regardless of these considerations, however,
greater priming was found for living concepts.
Greater priming among living concepts may be interpreted within Warrington and
Shallice’s (1984) SF1. In this perspective, living things are identified and processed
in terms of their visual attributes much more than are nonliving things. Because
research has shown category-specific activations in the fusifonn gyrus to even word
fonns of living objects, it is possible that the linkage between visual and verbal
representations of living things may be stronger than those for nonliving things te. g.,
Chao et al., 1999; Perani et al., 1999). Thus, because pictures were used to prime
4 Note that Neely (1991) does flot discuss repetÏtion priming such as that carried-out here.
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words and vice versa, increased priming for living things could be expected. Further,
to the extent that the paradigm employed in the current study makes exclusive use of
the visual modality, it may be argued that greater implicit memory for living things
benefited from this increased reliance on visual properties. In block PW in particular,
the SFT would predict that activation of studied living items would have been greater
in a visual semantic system, whereas nonliving items would have led to relative
activation within a functional semantic system. Because test phase items were visual
(i.e., words), perhaps this sensory/functional activational difference could have led to
greater priming.
The processes which underlie the type of conceptual priming tested here presumably
involve the activation of a concept node (or logogen) in semantic memory (Bower
1986, 1996; Collins and Loftus, 1975, Morton, 1969; Paivio, 1986). In this
perspective, a concept is activated, either by a picture or by a word, during the study
phase. The activation of the concept lingers into the test phase, and re-appraisal of
the same concept in the test phase is easier and more rapid compared to new,
unstudied items, resulting in faster RTs. An interpretation of the current resuits
within this perspective, especially given the fact that the variables discussed above
could have been expected to attenuate priming for living concepts, is that more
priming for living items occurred as a function of either: 1) greater study phase
activation for living than nonliving stimuli; andlor 2) improved retention of activation
of living as opposed to nonliving concepts.
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The question is, therefore, why greater activation may have taken place for living
versus nonliving things? In discussing the DSH, Caramazza and Shelton (1998)
suggest that when an object is encountered, rapid processing is can-ied out in order to
determine whether the object is living or nonliving. Because one ofthe hypothesized
differences between living and nonliving things - according to the DSH - involves an
increased emotional component for living things (fighting/fleeing/feeding), they
submit that a specialized system probably involving areas of the limbic system is
responsible for this process.
Although Caramazza and Shelton (1998) do not specify which structures of the
limbic system may play a role in this early analysis and classification process, it is
reasonable to hypothesize that the amygdala is involved. Various unes of evidence
indicate that the amygdala can respond automatically, rapidly, and without the co
occurrence of conscious awareness to emotionally salient stimuli (Ledoux, 1996;
Morris et al., 1996).
While no study has directly evaluated the hypothesis that living things have a greater
emotional sigriificance overail, at least one line of research supports this position. A
number of functional neuroimaging studies have found that the selective processing
of living items (both pictures and words) potentiates activation in early processing
areas of the ventral object processing stream, including the primary visual cortex, the
lingual, fusiform, media! occipital, and inferior occipital gyri (Chao et al., 1999;
Goodale & Milner, 1992; Martin et al., 1996; Okada et al., 2000; Perani et al., 1999,
1995). Aside from suggesting dissociable brain areas for the processing of living and
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nonhiving concepts, however, an interpretation of these results is lacking (Caramazza
and Shelton, 1998). It is flot known why early visual areas would 5e more active for
living versus nonliving stimuli.
One explanation, however, may corne frorn parallel research investigating the
processing of ernotional stimuli. A common finding, in such investigations, is
increased activation in the occipital lobe to emotionally salient stimuli (Junghofer et
al., 2001; Lang et al., 199$; Rama et al., 2001; Schneider et al., 1994; Tabert et al.,
2001; Taylor et al., 2000). Lang et al. (199$), for example, have found increased
occipital lobe activation in the area of the fusiform and occipital gyri when subjects
viewed either emotionally negative or positive as opposed to emotionally neutral
images. A putative explanation of these results is that increased attention potentiates
early visual processing (Lane et al., 1999; Lang et al., 1997). It is further
hypothesized that the arnygdala plays a role in this process. If this is true, and if the
increased activation recorded in visual areas to pictures of living versus nonliving
concepts ftrnctions along similar lines, then the notion that living items are more
emotionally salient than nonliving items receives some empirical support. An
implication of the amygdala in this process is supported by a study by Simpson and
colleagues (Simpson et al., 2000) who found increased activation in the right fusiform
gyrus to negatively valenced pictures together with an increase in activation of limbic
areas, including the amygdala. If the ability to recognize living things lias a
Darwinian survival value, then it is reasonable to expect that the processing of living
entities may similarly benefit from increased attention.
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While this position makes intuitive sense in the case where study phase items are
pictorial representations of living things, the relationship is less clear when the items
presented at study are words. In accordance with Paivio’s (1926) dual code
hypothesis, however, it is possible that lexical representations of living things may
activate their (abstract) pictorial representations. In this view, the hypothesized
increased emotional salience of living things may have given rise to potentiated
attention, which in tum led to greater conceptual activation. Within this perspective,
therefore, it is possible that greater priming for living things took place because living
items were more emotionally salient. Because this study did not directly manipulate
the variable of emotional salience with respect to living and nonliving things, it is
difficult to draw specific conclusions on this point. It would be interesting indeed to
directly address this hypothesis in future research.
Finally, it is somewhat troublesome that the priming observed for nonliving items
failed to reach significance. Priming in the current paradigm is very subtle and
difficuÏt to measure. The fact that, on average, subjects responded 20 miÏliseconds
faster to target than to distractor nonliving items when words primed pictures,
however, is somewhat comforting. It suggests that while the magnitude of priming
was insufficient to be revealed by a three way ANOVA, the effect may have been
present at a low level.
As discussed in the Introduction, explanations of category-specific semantic deficits
fall under two main divisions: theories which posit the existence of multiple
semantics, and unitary semantics theories. The current finding of differential
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conceptual priming for living versus nonliving concepts among neurologically intact
subj ects is in une with a wealth of research conducted among brain-damaged patients
which has found category-specific semantic memory loss across a living/nonliving
distinction. As such, the current resuits provide converging evidence for differences
in the representation of living and nonliving concepts. A parsimonious account of the
durrent resuits lies within the idea of greater (or longer lasting) study phase activation
for living items. These results are compatible with the view that these two categories
ofobjects are differentially processed within somewhat dissociable semantic systems.
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Table 1: Items used in both blocks
BlockPW Block WP
Study Picture lest Word Status Study Word Test Picture Status
Butterfly Papillon Target chèvre Goat Target
Monkey Singe Target mouton Sheep Target
Horse Cheval Target alligator Alligator Target
Chicken Poule Target chameau Camel Target
Peanut Arachide Target fraises Strawberry Target
Grapes Raisins Target tomate Tomato Target
Celery Celery Target banane Banana Target
Cherry Cerise Target ananas Pineapple Target
Motorcycle motocyclette Target tournevis Screwdriver Target
Pen Stylo Target ciseaux Scissors Target
Saw Scie Target bicyclette Bicycle Target
Fork Fourchette Target chemise Shirt Target
Train Train Target voilier Sailboat Target
Airpiane Avion Target peigne Comb Target
Hat Chapeau Target pantalon Pants Target
Dress Robe Target ceinture Belt Target
Oiseau Distractor Snail )istracto:
Lapin Distractor Penguin )istracto:
Poisson Distractor Zebra )istracto:
Souris Distractor Tiger )istracto:
Mangue Distractor Mushroom )istracto
Abricot Distractor Apple )istracto
Betterave Distractor Carrot Distracto
Haricot Distractor Pear Distracto
Veston Distractor Truck Distracto
Balai Distractor Coat Distractor
Autobus Distractor Shoe Distractoi
Tablier Distractor Broom )istractoi
Crayon Distractor Sock )istractoi
Casque Distractor Knife )istractoi
Gant Distractor Bow )istractoi
Chaise Distractor Car )istracto
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Table 2: Stimulus characteristics. Mean (and standard devïations) for
familiarity and complexity ratings according to the Snodgrass & Vanderwart
(1980) norms. Frequency ratings are according to Brulex French word norms
(Content, Mousty & Radeau, 1990).
Block PW: Study phase picture data
Group Familïarity Complexity
Living 2.89 (.74) 3.45 (.97)
Nonliving 3.69 (.67) 3.14 (.68)
Block PW: Test phase word data
Group Frequency Number of Letters
Primed Living 287 (79.8) 6.38 (1.2)
Distractor Living 288 (67.6) 6.63 (1.2)
PrimedNonliving 325.5 (77.8) 6.3$ (2.97)
Distractor Nonliving 326 (3 0.6) 5.88 (0.99)
Block WP: Study phase word data
Group Frequency Number of Letters
Living 258.4 (53) 6.6(1)
Nonliving 295.5(59) 7.7(1.3)
Block WP: Test phase picture data
Group Familiarïty Complexity
Primed Living 2.6 3.2
Distractor Living 2.7 3.1
Primed Nonliving 4.0 2.7
Distractor Nonliving 4.0 2.7
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Figure 1: For both blocks, Ris (measured in ms) were faster to living items, Ris
were quicker to targets than to distractors items, subjects responded
more quickly to pictures than to words, and significant prïming was
observed for living items whereas nonlïving items showed negligîble
priming.
Ris as a function of condition
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Abstract
This study investigated whether the strength of implicit memory would vary as a
ftrnction of emotional valence. Thirty-three participants were presented with pictures
which were preceded by subliminally presented words which denoted the objects
imaged in the pictures. Pictures and words were either emotionally positive,
negative, or neutral. Directly following study sessions, a lexical decision test was
administered to record response times to primed (repeated from the studied list)
versus distractor (unstudied) words. Results revealed that negative items led to
significantly more priming than positive or neutral items which failed to elicit
significant priming. Results suggest that negative - but flot positive
- emotional
valence potentiates repetition priming.
Keywords
Emotions, Subliminal, Priming, Valence
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Introduction
Research has demonstrated an explicit memory advantage for emotionally salient as
opposed to emotionally neutral stimuli across a wide range of tasks (e.g., Cahili &
McGaugh, 1995; Danion, Kauffrnann-Muller, Grange, & Zimmerman, 1995;
Doerksen & Shimamura, 2001; Palomba, Angrilli, & Mini, 1997). Some evidence
suggests that negative items are better remembered than their positive counterparts
(Dewhurst & Pany, 2000; Kitayama, 1996; Phelps, LaBar, & Spencer, 1997).
Less research has been conducted to examine the impact of emotional salience on
implicit memory. Whereas tests of explicit memory cail for effortful conscious recali
(or recognition) of studied material, implicit memory tasks make no reference to
studied material; implicit memory is revealed by increased efficiency in the
processing of previously encountered information (BÏaxton, 1992; Graf & Schacter,
1985; Squire, 1992).
Three paradigms have been employed to explore the question of emotional implicit
memory. The first resembles Pavlovian classical conditioning (Morris, Oehman, &
Dolan, 1998; Pavlov, 1927). Parra, Esteves, Flykt, and Oehman (1997), for example,
paired a mild electric shock (UCS) with the picture of an angry face (CS). Changes
in subjects’ skin conductance revealed the effects of the UCS when the CS only was
presented.
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A second paradigm which has sought to investigate emotional implicit memory is the
mere exposure effect. In this paradigm, a previously neutral item gamers a certain
emotional status relative to other neutral items merely as a function of repetition. Tri a
typical paradigm, a meaningless ideogram is ftashed so briefly as to be below the
leveÏ of conscious awareness. Emotional implicit memory is revealed to the extent
that subjects develop a preference for that particular ideogram as opposed to other
(almost identical) ideograms upon subsequent supraliminal presentations (Morris et
al., 1998; Whittlesea & Price, 2001; Zajonc, 2001).
A third method for evaluating implicit emotional memory is that of mood-congruent
leaming (e.g., Bower, 1981). This method is exemplified in a study by Bradley,
Mogg, and Millar (1996), in which clinically depressed subjects showed increased
priming of subliminally presented depression-relevant words on a lexical decision
test. Mood-congruent memoiy takes advantage of the inherent valence of studied
stimuli but only so far as it interacts with mood state.
To evaluate whether implicit memory may be strengthened by the endogenous
emotional nature of studied items, Matthews, Pitcaithly, and Mann (1995), compared
semantic priming for positive (ex: “attractive” primes “desirable”), negative, and
emotionally neutral adjectives in a semantically primed lexical decision paradigm
among normal subjects and found greater priming for negative as opposed to positive
and neutral words.
57
To our knowledge, no published studies have examined the effect of emotional
valence among concrete objects on cross-form identity priming. The current
experiment was conducted in order to examine whether this form of priming is
modulated by the emotional valence of presented items. The paradigm employed
picture-to-word priming with test phase words presented in a lexical decision task.
According to Paivio’s dual coding theory, individual conceptual representations
(concepts) are stored in two parallel semantic systems: one (visual) system contains
“imagens” which are pictorial representations of objects, and another (verbal) system
contains “logogens” which are lexical representations ofobjects (Paivio, 1978; Paivio
& Begg, 1981). In Paivio’s system, priming can be seen as the resuit of a transitive
activation of logogens or of imagens. Because activation spreads from an imagen to
logogen and vice versa, cross-form priming is expected to occur.
In the study phase of the current experiment, presented images were preceded by
subliminally presented words. Each subliminally presented word depicted the object
denoted by the subsequent image. Words were presented in order to increase the
likelihood that an encountered image would activate a specific lexical entry; that is to
enhance the mapping of an imagen to a specific logogen.
In une with evidence that negative items are better remembered than their positive
counterparts and with Matthews et al.’s (1995), finding of greater priming for
negative words, it was predicted that negative images would lead to increased
priming relative to both neutral and positive images.
5$
Metliods
Subjects
12 male and 21 female volunteers, aged 18 to 35 years old (mean = 22.6, SD 3.2)
participated in this study. Subjects were recruited from local university and college
campuses. All subjects signed informed consent forms and were paid a nominal fee
for their participation. Upon questioning conducted prior to the start of the study,
none ofthe subjects reported any history ofneurological or psychiatric problems. Ail
subjects were native English speakers.
Materïals
The study phases included the presentation of images taken from the International
Affective Picture System (lAPS) stimulus database (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert,
1997). LAPS images have been rated for valence (pleasantness). From the LAPS, a
total of 12 negative images (mean valence rating = 2.6, SD = 0.76), 12 positive
images (mean valence rating = 7.5, SD = 0.62), and 24 neutral images (mean valence
rating = 5.2, SD = 0.5) were presented during the study phases ofthe experiment.
Words were taken from the Affective Norms for English Words (AI\ŒW) corpus
prepared by the Center for the Study of Emotion and Attention at the University of
Florida (Bradley & Lang, 1999). This corpus is a collection of words which have
similarly been rated for valence. From the corpus, a total of 12 negative, 12 positive,
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and 24 neutral words were chosen to match the images presented during the study
phases of the experiment. An equal number of words, matched for valence and
iength, served as distractors during the test phases. Words were matched group by
group by t-tests (for ail comparisons p 0.73)
Test phase primed (repeated from the study phase) and unprimed words were
matched for valence, frequency, and number of ietters using t-tests (ail p 0.92).
More importantiy, these items were matched based on lexicai decision Ris produced
by a pre-experimentai group of 31 subjects (matched for age, education, and gender
with the experimental group). Groupings of words used in the current experiment
were created based on these results. Average ftequency for positive, negative, and
neutral words was 29 per million according to the Kucera & francis (1967) norms.
T-tests reveaied that whereas positive items and neutrai items did flot differ from each
other in tenus of frequency, negative items were siightly less frequent (frequency
15.6) than both neutrai items (frequency = 35; p <0.05) and positive items (ftequency
= 33; p < 0.05). Note that frequencies between 10 and 75 per million are considered
to be of medium frequency (Burgess & Livesay, 1998). Thus, notwithstanding this
statisticai difference, phenomenologically, all test words were of medium frequency.
The average number ofietters for ail words was 6.1 (SD = 1.9). The three groups of
words did not differ significantly from each other with respect to number of letters.
Test phase nonwords were created by replacing one or two letters from a separate list
ofreal words.
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Procedure
In order to minimize memory load, the implicit memory experiment was divided into
4 sessions, each session consisting of a study phase directly followed by an associated
test phase. A given test phase followed its respective study phase by a delay of
approximately one minute. In the study phases, images were directly preceded by
subliminally presented words. The subliminal effect was achieved by presenting the
word in yellow text on a white background (thereby reducing the contrast of the
stimulus). Pilot testing (among the 31 pilot subjects) was used to determine
presentation parameters. When words were presented in black text on white
background or when the yellow text was presented for longer than 77 ms, they were
clearly visible. When words were presented in yellow text at 60 ms, these pilot
subjects were unable to verbally report the words. The presentation parameters were
therefore set as follows (see Figure 1): A word was presented for 60 ms. The word
was immediately foïlowed by the presentation of a row of yellow number signs on a
black background for 17 ms. Following this masking stimulus, the screen was blank
(i.e., black) for 500 ms. Next, an image which repeated the concept denoted by the
preceding word was presented for 595 ms. A 2000 ms pause occurred before the
presentation of the next word.
The emotional valence of each word-image pair (WIP) was congruent (cx: negative
word “corpse” paired with the image of a dead body). A total of 12 WIPs were
presented in each study phase. Therefore, a total of 36 WIPs were presented to each
subject. Half of the WIPs were affectively neutral (ex: stool) while the other half
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were either negative (ex: corpse) or positive (ex: flower), depending on the session.
A given session either included negative and neutral WIPs or positive and neutral
W1Ps, but negative and positive WIPs were neyer presented in the same session. The
order of sessions was counterbalanced across subjects and the order or WIP
presentation was randomized for each subj ect.
In each test phase, a lexical decision task was administered. In this test, stimuli
(words and nonwords in equal proportions) were presented one at a time in black font
on a white background. Word or nonword stimuli were presented for 3000 ms — or
until the subject made a response. Upon the presentation of each stimulus, the subject
had to decide if the presented stimulus constituted a real word in the English language
or not. Subjects revealed their decisions by pressing one oftwo keys on the computer
keyboard using their index or adjacent middle finger for responding. Response side
was counterbalanced across subjects (i.e., an equal number of subjects used their
index finger to indicate words and nonwords). Half of the presented words repeated
the items that had been presented at study (targets) and half were new, previously
unencountered words (distractors).
All stimuli were presented on a laptop computer and the computer recorded each
subject’s RTs.
(Figure 1 about here)
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Resuits
In une with pilot testing results, many subjects reported having seen the masking
stimulus (number signs). Only one subject, however, suspected that words were
being subliminally presented. This subj ect’ s data was not used for study analyses.
ftideed, the remaining subjects were surprised to leam that words had been presented.
All errors were removed from the analysis (note that a comparison of errors per
stimulus type did flot show any differences and that generally speaking, very few
errors — less than 3% were committed). Median RTs for each subject to each group
ofword targets were calculated, and a 2 (target vs. distractor) X 3 (neutral vs. positive
vs. negative) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out on the data (see Table
1). Results revealed a main effect of condition (F(1,32) = 22.41; p < 0.0001). A
Tukey test was used to determine that subjects responded more quickly to positive
(617 ms) than to neutral (647 ms) or negative words (666 ms). A main effect was
also found for priming (F(1,32) = 4.93; p = 0.0335) reflecting faster RTs to targets
(638.7 ms) than to distractor (648 ms) words. Jmportantly, this effect interacted with
condition (F(2,64) = 4.18; p 0.0196). Significant priming (29 ms, RTs were 4.3%
faster to targets than to distractors) was found for emotionally negative items (F(1 ,32)
= 9.83; p = 0.0037), whereas emotionally positive and neutral items faiÏed to elicit
priming.
(Table 1 about here)
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Discussion
This study has used a novel research approach to demonstrate that implicit memory is
stronger for negatively valenced than for neutral or positively valenced stimuli. The
present finding of enhanced implicit memory for stimuli carrying a negative
emotional charge is in une with previous research discussed in the Introduction. Ibis
valence-dependent effect did flot rely on mood-state, no preference judgment was
accrued by subjects, and no classical conditioning took place. Rather, it was shown
that previous passive processing of negatively valenced stimuli led to enhanced
impÏicit memory ofthose stimuli later on.
What might account for these resuits? One possibility is that the negative stimuli in
the current experiment were more effective at eliciting emotional responses. Because
many of the negative WWs impÏicated the human body (mutilations) or fearfuÏ
creatures (like snakes), it may be that the emotions of disgust or fear were more
effectively elicited by these stimuli as cornpared to the positive stimuli. In this case,
the studied negative stimuli may have lefi a stronger impression on the subjects than
the relatively benign neutral or positive stimuli.
We were surprised to fmd that neutral and positive stimuli did flot provoke significant
priming. It should be noted, however, that the type ofpriming used in our experiment
may be quite subtie and difficuit to measure (Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 1996).
Previous research in our lab (Beauregard, Chertkow, Gold, & Karama, 1997;
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Beauregard, Benhamou, Laurent, & Chertkow, 1999) and in others (e.g., WhittÏesea
et al., 2001) has found that a number of repetitions of the to-be-remembered items
may be helpful in this form of priming. In the current study, each study item was
presented only once. This was done in order to avoid a ceiling effect in the priming
performance of our subjects which we feit would be necessary given that we were
attempting to examine subtie differences in the magnitude ofpriming as a function of
emotional valence. In the face of these limitations, the finding of significant priming
for negative items supports the notion that negative stimuli are better remembered,
even on tests of implicit memory.
In conclusion, the resuits of this study suggest that negative stimuli lead to enhanced
implicit memoiy performance. These data fit with the findings of improved explicit
memory for negatively valenced stimuli. These converging lines of evidence suggest
that there is something special about negative stimuli as they interact with memory.
Possibilities include the greater ease on the part ofnegative stimuli to elicit emotional
responses. These data are also consistent with the idea that differential neural
structures process negative stimuli, although that question is best suited to brain
imaging studies.
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Figure 1: An example of stimulus presentation during the study phase of the implicit
memory experiment. Presentation times are represented in milliseconds (ms).
f
6Oms
#######
l7ms 500ms 595ms
Table 1: RTs (standard deviation) to test phase items
Neutral Positive Negative
Primes 647.7 (103) 617.1 (98) 65 1.1 (94)
Distractors 647 (97) 617.3 (86) 680.3 (119)
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Abstract
No previous brain imaging studies of priming have used a cross-form subliminal
paradigm. This study employed such a paradigm with the objective of studying the
neural substrate of conceptual priming in the absence of repetition of perceptual
information from study to test and in the absence of the possibility of contamination
by explicit memory. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, 10 male subjects
were scanned while they were subÏiminally exposed to pictures which were
immediately followed by primed or unprimed target words. Resuits revealed that
priming among nonliving targets was accompanied by a decrease in activity in
bilateral occipitotemporal areas as well as the left anterior superior temporal gyrus.
Resuits are discussed in the context of the kind of processes which may underlie this
type of priming and of the repetition suppression which occurred in areas known to
be implicated in semantic processing.
Key words: conceptual priming, cross-form priming, repetition suppression,
subliminal, magnetic resonance imaging, semantic memory
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Introduction
Priming is a form of implicit memory in which the processing of a stimulus is
rendered more efficient as a resuit of previous exposure to that stimulus (Schacter,
1987). Priming has been related to decreased regional cerebral blood flow,
commonly referred to as repetition suppression (RS) (Desimone, 1996; Lebreton et
al., 2001; Squire et al., 1992). In conceptual priming, it is probable that brain areas
underlying semantic processing are involved because semantic processing of the test
items is oflen required (Chertkow et al., 1992; Riddoch and Humphreys, 1987).
Semantic memory has been linked to a network of brain areas which proceeds
anteriorily (and ventralÏy), from the occipital through to the temporal and frontal
lobes (Martin and Chao, 2001; Vandenberghe et al., 1996). Jndeed, many areas of
this network have been associated with priming. In the occipitotemporal lobes, the
lingual, fusiform, and cuneus gyri (Brodmann area — BA - 18, 19, and 37) have been
linked to picture naming (Murtha et al., 1999), and both perceptual and conceptual
priming (Koutstaal et al., 2001; Lebreton et al., 2001; Yasuno et al., 2000). Further,
Badgaiyan et al. (2001) have hypothesized that BA 19 partially mediates within
modality priming. In the lateral temporal lobes, Mummery et al. (1999) found RS in
BA 38 using semantic priming and hypothesized that activity in this area was related
to the identification of a concept denoted by a word. Finally, the left inferior frontal
lobe, hypothesized to be involved in phonology and semantic retrieval (Murtha et al.,
1999), has shown RS in studies ofconceptual priming (e.g., Gabrieli et al., 1996).
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In most studies, because primes are consciously perceivable, activity ostensibly
related to implicit memory may be contaminated by explicit memory. Subliminal
priming, however, can be used to circumvent this problem (Beauregard et al., 199$,
1999). In a study by Dehaene et al. (2001), subliminal priming-related RS was
observed in left fusiform gyrus (BA 37). Although words were presented in differing
case, font change may not be a strong enough manipulation to conclude that RS in the
fusiform reflects abstract non-lexical semantic activation. A stronger way to
circumvent the repetition of perceptual information is with the use of cross-form
priming in which primes and targets are of differing form altogether (e.g., pictures
and words).
The present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study was conducted to
determine the neural substrate of subliminal cross-form conceptual priming. We
were motivated by the prediction that brain areas implicated in semantic memory play
a roÏe in conceptual priming. Specifically, we hypothesized that priming would lead
to RS in areas of the occipitotemporal cortex known to be implicated in the semantic
processing of pictures, because in our study, priming depends on such processing.
We also predicted that RS would be observed in BA 38 of the lateral temporal lobe
because infonnation gleaned from the processing of pictures would facilitate the
processing of words at test. Finally, based on results from previous studies of
conceptual priming, we predicted that the left inferior prefrontal cortex would show
priming-related blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal changes.
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Materials and Methods
Subjects
Ten male French-speaking subjects (right-handed Caucasian university students; age
range: 19-28, mean = 24, S.D. = 2.3) participated in this study. No subject had a
history of either psychiatric or neurological disorder. These subjects ail gave written
informed consent and the ethics committee of Centre hospitalier de l’Université De
Montréal (CHUM), Hôpital Notre-Dame, approved the study. Ail subjects were paid
an honorarium for their participation.
Materials
Virtuai reality style goggies connected to a MR compatible video system (Resonance
Teclmology, Inc., Van Nuys, CA, USA) were used to present the stimuli to subjects
within the environment of the fMRI scanner. These goggles were connected to a PC
which presented ah stimuli and collected response times (RTs).
Simple une drawings of common objects (compiled by Alario and ferrand, 1999)
were presented in gray on a white background. Foiiowing each drawing, French
words were presented in black text on a white background (for stimuli used, see
Appendix A).
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Procedure
BOLD signal changes were measured while subjects responded to target words
preceded either by subliminally presented distractor or prime drawings. Prime-target
pairs referred to the same concept; for example, a drawing of a helicopter preceded
the French equivalent of the English word “helicopter”. Distractor-target pairs
referred to different concepts; for exampie, a drawing of a book preceded the French
equivalent of the Engiish word “cat”. One hundred and twelve targets were
presented, half of which were primed, and haif of which were unprimed. Haif of the
targets represented living things, and haif represented non-living things. Thus, in ail
there were 28 primed living targets, 28 unprimed living targets, 28 primed nonliving
targets, and 28 unprimed nonliving targets.
The sequence of events representing one triai in the experiment was as follows: a
masking stimulus was presented for 100 ms, a line drawing was presented for 34 ms,
the screen went biank for 17 ms, the mask appeared again for 100 ms, the screen
again went blank for 200 ms, a target word appeared for 1600 ms, and a fixation point
appeared in the middie ofthe screen for either 2.8, 3.0, 3.2, 3.4, or 3.6 s (see figure
1). This procedure was based on work conducted by Dell’Acqua and Grainger
(1999). Thus, the primes (i.e., drawings) were presented subliminaiiy. Upon the
presentation of targets, the subject was required to make a two-choice response. The
question to which the subject responded was: “Does this word represent something
which is man-made or naturaiiy occurring?” Subjects were instructed to respond as
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quickly as possible. To do so, they used the first two digits of their right hands and
finger laterality (lefl-right) was counterbaÏanced across subjects.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Image acquisition and analyses
Echoplanar images (EPI) were acquired on a 1.5 Tesla system (Magnetom Vision,
Siemens Electric, Eriangen, Germany). Twenty-eight slices (5 mm thick) were
acquired every 2.65 sec in an inclined axial plane, aligned with the AC-PC axis.
These T2 weighted functional images were acquired using an event-related EPI pulse
sequence (TE = 44 msec, Flip 900, FOV = 215 mm, Matrix = 64 x 64). The
ftmctional image mn consisted of 247 sequential whole-brain acquisitions and Ïasted
for 12.5 min. Pnor to each run, 3 images were acquired and discarded in order to
allow longitudinal magnetization to reach equilibrium. Foliowing the functional mn,
high-resolution anatomical data were acquired via a Tl-weighted three-dimensional
volume acquisition obtained using a gradient echo pulse sequence (TR 9.7 ms, TE
=4 ms, Flip = 12° FOV = 250 mm, Matrix = 256 x 256).
Data were analyzed using Statisticai Parametric Mapping software (SPM99,
Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neuroiogy, London, UK). limages for ail
subjects were realigned to correct for artifacts due to small head movements. The
images for ail subjects were then spatiaiiy normalized (voxel size: 3 mm x 3 mm x 3
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mm) into an MRI stereotaxic space (Talairach and Toumoux, 198$) using this
masked mean image. Images were then convolved in space with a three-dimensional
isotropic gaussian kemel (12 mm FWRM) to improve the signal-to-noise ratio and to
accommodate for residual variations in functional neuroanatômy that usually persist
between subjects afier spatial normalization. Normalized data were then selectively
averaged in relation to condition within and across subjects.
For the event-related statistical analysis, a hemodynamic response function (hrf) with
time derivative was used to model the activation pattems. Effects at each and every
voxel were estimated using the general linear model. An averaged event-related
statistical parametric map of the t statistic (SPM t), subsequently transformed to the
unit normal distribution (SPM Z) was computed for each trial type. A “fixed-effects
model” was implemented to contrast the brain activity associated with responses to
primed and unprimed target words.
To delineate the brain regions associated with priming, the brain activity associated
with responses to unprimed words was directly compared with the brain activity
associated with responses to primed words. A small volume correction was
performed in brain regions (ROIs) defined a priori. The search volume
corresponding to the ROIs was defined a priori based on a meta-analysis of brain
activity recorded in relation to tasks which tap semantic memory and conceptual
priming (see Introduction). This meta-analysis yielded focal points and penumbras of
activation in the fusiform gyrus (BA 19/37), the lingual gyrus (BA 19), the cuneus
(BA 17/18), the anterior superior temporal gyrus (BA 22/3 8), and the left inferior
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preftontal cortex (BA 45, 46, 47). This information was applied to the MR reference
image (MNI template) using the small volume correction (SVC) and sphere volume
function in SPM99. For this search, a corrected probability threshold for multiple
comparisons of p <0.05 was used. Only clusters showing a spatial extent of at least 5
contiguous voxels were kept for image analysis.
Resuits
Behavioral
As expected, subjects were unable to consciously perceive the primes in the current
study. Jndeed, following the experimental session, all subjects were surprised to
leam that the line drawings had been presented at alI. Thus, the desired subliminal
effect was achieved witli complete success.
A two factor ANOVA (priming, semantic category) was carried out on the data.
Results revealed a main effect of priming (F1,9 = 15.4, p <0.005), indicating that a
significant priming effect (2.5% overail; percentage priming = (RT Distractor
— RT
prime! RT Distractor) x 100) was present (RTs primed = 782 ms, RTs unprimed =
802 ms). An interaction was also observed between priming and semantic category
(F i, = 6.1, p <0.05), with significant priming occurring for nonliving things (5.4%)
(RTs primed 765 ms, RTs unprimed = $09 ms). No priming effect was noted for
living things (see Figure 2).
$0
[liisert Figure 2 about here]
Neuroimaging
Unprimed Targets — Primed Targets
Voxels which were less active in the primed condition relative to the unprimed
condition are shown in Table 1. This subtraction revealed that areas of the bilateral
inferior occipital lobe (BA 17, 18/19) and an area in the lefi superior temporal lobe
(BA 22/38) were less active when subjects responded to primed versus unprimed
target words (see Figure 3).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Living targets — Nonliving Targets
Although there was no significant difference in RTs to living and nonliving items, a
subtraction of these two conditions was nevertheless performed due to the long-
standing debate as to the possibly dissociable neural substrates of these semantic
categories (Burin et al., 1998; Caramazza, 2000; Caramazza and Shelton, 199$;
McRae and Cree, 2002; Warrington and Shallice, 1984). Greater activity was
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recorded in right middle frontal gyrus (BA 6/9) in response to living versus nonliving
targets. No other voxels reached significance.
Discussion
Behaviorally, this study confirmed the findings that unconsciously perceived primes
can have a conceptual effect on the processing of subsequently presented targets. In
terms of the underlying brain activity associated with this priming, occipitotemporal
areas which have shown RS in other priming studies also displayed RS in our
paradigm. Fusiform gyrus, however, did not show priming-related modulation in
BOLD signal response. Finally, as predicted, an area implicated in higher-order
semantic processing, the anterior superior temporal gyrus, was also implicated in the
current conceptually driven priming paradigm.
There is some debate as to the extent to which semantic processing is carried out on
subliminally presented stimuli (Damian, 2001; Dehaene et al., 2001; Marcel, 1983).
In a study by Dehaene et al. (2001), the subliminal presentation of numerical primes
(Arabic numerals or English equivalents) decreased Ris to a subsequent “large or
small” binary decision task (above or below 5). The interpretation proposed for this
“response congruity” effect was that primes were being so deeply processed that
subjects were unconsciously applying the task instructions to them. The authors
suggested that when the responses to the prime and to the target were incongruent, a
siowing of RT occurred either because the subjects inhibited the original response or
$2
because the subject had to switch motor programming for the response output to the
target. A subsequent experiment by Damian (2001) lias, however, called this
assumption into question. In these experiments, when the primes were not part of the
response set (i.e., were flot responded to explicitly at some point in the experiment),
the effect disappeared. Damian (2001) submitted that rather than semantic
categorization of the primes being responsible for the effect, automatic processing
may have played a role. In this perspective, because the primes in Dehaene et al.
(2001) and in Damian (2001) were repeatedly paired with a given response, the
process became automatic and a stimulus-response relationship rather than deep
processing of the primes resulted in the effect. In contrast, our resuits, and those of
Dell’Acqua and Grainger (1999) support the contention that subliminally presented
primes are processed in a meaningful way. A casual examination of Figure 2
suggests that the priming effect obsewed here may have reftected an interference
effect (i.e.,, negative priming) of living primes on RTs to nonliving targets. In other
words, when our subjects unconsciously perceived a stimulus denoting a living entity,
the stimulus may have been categorized as such, and it is possible that an appropriate
response was prepared, ultimately leading to a need to “switch gears” in order to
respond to the incongruent target. When the prime and the target were both
nonliving, a small facilitatoiy effect was probably also present. As such, the priming
observed in this study may be attributable to semantic activation of the primes
leading ta increased processing efficiency when prime and target were identical, or ta
the interference effect that could have occurred when they were from opposing
semantic categories, or both. Future research will be needed to further explore this
question.
$3
The present finding of decreased activity in left BA 19 in relation to cross-form
subliminal priming supports the hypothesis ofBadgaiyan et al. (2001) that this area is
at least partially responsible for the mediation of within-modality priming. Left
extrastriate involvement in priming is consistent with previous studies using a variety
of methodologies (e.g., Badgaiyan et al., 2001; Buckner et al., 1995). Whereas
Badgaiyan et al. (2001) demonstrated priming-related changes in activity in BA 19,
even when the surface form of stimuli was varied from study to test, our resuits
further reveal that this area remains involved even when primes are unconsciously
perceived. Further, this activity survives a stronger change in form than that used by
Badgaiyan et al. (2001); namely, picture-to-word priming. In contrast, the right
occipital involvement measured in our paradigm is likely to reflect the nonverbal
(pictorial) nature of the priming stimuli. This result extends the contention by
Lebreton et al. (2001) that right occipital cortex represents a fomiat-specific system
that processes the form of figurative drawings by suggesting that the right occipital
lobe (cuneus) may represent an interface between object foini and semantic
knowledge relative to form. Findings of right cuneus involvement in the semantic
processing ofpictures supports this notion (Kosslyn et al., 1994, 1995; Martin et al.,
1996; Murtha et al., 1999).
The lack of priming-related changes in BOLD signal in left fiisiform cortex is
intriguing because many other studies have found priming-related changes in this
area. There is some debate, however, as to whether this area may subserve the lexical
activation provoked by either visually or auditorally presented pictures or words
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(Grili-Spector, 2001; Koutstaal et al., 2001). Because our pictures were presented
subliminally, it is possible that this lexical-level activation did flot take place.
Further, previous investigations which have found BOLD signal changes in this area
have used explicit perception of studied stimuli. future research will undoubtedly
continue to delineate the role that left fusiform cortex plays in priming.
RS recorded in the superior temporal gyrus may reflect a facilitation of semantic
retrieval of item specific information. This view follows from Damasio et al.’s
(1996) idea that the anterior temporal lobes are involved in this process. Ours is not
the first conceptually driven brain imaging study to find priming-related changes in
this area. RS has been found, for instance, in the superior temporal lobe (BA 22/40)
in word-stem completion priming study (Yasuno et al., 2000). Further anteriorily, the
temporal polar region (BA 38) has been implicated in a brain imaging investigation
of semantic priming (Mummery et al., 1999). Lesions of the temporal lobes have
been shown to promote difficulties in object naming and in defining objects (Hart and
Gordon, 1990; Martin and Chao, 2001; Tranel et al., 1997; Warrington, 1975).
Because the priming employed in the durrent paradigm repeated the identity of the
targets, our results concur with the notion that the anterior superior temporal gyrus is
critically involved in the selection and short-terni maintenance of item specific
semantic information.
The lefi inferior frontal cortex was hypothesized to show priming-related BOLD
signal changes in the current study. The fact that no changes were obsewed was a
surprise which is somewhat difficuit to interpret. This area is hypothesized to be
85
involved in the phonological aspect of semantic activation. In this perspective,
because the task was one of classification and because the primes were drawings that
were presented subliminally, it is unlikely that phonological processing would have
been elicited by the task. Lefi inferior prefrontal cortex is also hypothesized to be
cmcially involved in semantic retrieval. The resuits presented here do flot support
this position.
Finally, the fact that this study yielded priming for nonliving things but not for living
things is somewhat troubling. Afier ail, theories regarding an apparent living
nonliving distinction in semantic memory may have predicted the opposite effect.
For example, Caramazza and Shelton (1998) have suggested that living things hold a
special place in semantic memory and experimental evidence suggests that living
things in particular are evaluated very rapidly by the brain, perhaps because
throughout evolution they were more important to survival (LeDoux, 1996). We
interpret this effect, however, in the perspective that the prirning observed in this
paradigm included both interference and facilitation. If it is true that living things are
more semantically salient than nonliving things, then it is possiNe that the interfering
effect of living things on responses to nonliving targets would be greater than in the
opposite scenario. further, it is possible that RTs to living items were less
susceptible to priming due to a ceiling effect on RTs. Future research will be needed
to clarify these issues.
In conclusion, our resuits support the notion that even unconsciously perceives
stimuli can yield conceptually bound effects on behavior. This study also shows that
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this process can Ïead to changes in cortical activity measurable with fMRI. Whereas
occipital areas were involved in these changes, the fact that fusiform gyrus was flot
activated in our study suggests that previous paradigms which have generated BOLD
signal changes in this region may have relied on either explicit lexical activation or
on the repetition of perceptual information. Finally, the implication of the lefi
anterior temporal cortex in cross-form conceptual priming is in une with the idea that
this region is involved in the short-term maintenance of semantic information.
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Table 1. Significant Ioci of decreased activity
Region Brodmann
area
Stereotaxic coordinates are derived from the human atlas of Talairach and Toumoux
(1988) and refer to medial - lateral position (x) relative to mediine (positive = right),
anterior - posterior position (y) relative to the anterior commissure (positive =
anterior), and superior — inferior position (z) relative to the commissural line (positive
superior). Designation of Brodmann areas are also based on this atlas. L, lefi; R,
right.
Talairach Z
- Corrected
coordinates
X Y Z statistic p value
Nonliving Neutral — Nonliving Primed
condition
R. Cuneus 17/18 21 -63 14 3.50 p=O.019
L. Lingual 19 -6 -65 -9 3.45 p = 0.022
L. Anterior supenor temporal 22/38 -59 6 -5 3.20 p = 0.046
Lïving Target — Nonliving Target
condition
R. Middle frontal gyrus 6/8 51 14 44 3.64 p = 0.01
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Figures
figure 1: Graphïcal representation of behavioral paradigm
Schematic representation of images as they appeared to subjects in the cross-form
subliminal paradigm.
I lOOms I 34ms l7ms I lOOms I l7ms I lOOms I 3000ms
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Figure 2: Mean Ris to targets
I
Nonhiving
81o
_I
750 —
Living
Graphical representation of behavioral data. Ris are given in ms. There is no
significant difference in RTs to primed and unprimed living targets. * Indicates that a
significant difference in RTs was recorded for primed versus unprimed nonliving
targets (p < 0.005).
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Figure 3: Priming-dependent BOLU signal changes on rendered cortex
Whole-brain statistical activation maps showing distinct foci of cortical activations
(red voxels) in the neutral — primed subtraction. Activation foci are superimposed on
a rendcred template brain. L, lefi; R, right.
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Appendix A: items used in the current experiment
Category Status Images Words
living distractor accordion abeille
living distractor anchor agneau
living distractor anvil âne
living distractor ashtray baleine
living distractor axe bison
living distractor bench carotte
living distractor bicycle chameau
living distractor book chat
living distractor bottle chenille
living distractor bowi chèvre
living distractor broom cochon
living distractor brush crabe
living distractor bus fourmi
living distractor car fraise
living distractor chimney grenouille
living distractor clothespin hibou
living distractor couch lama
living distractor door lézard
living distractor dresser lion
living distractor drum morse
living distractor dustpan oignon
living distractor fence phoque
living distractor fire hydrant poisson
living distractor frying pan poule
living distractor frumel rat
living distractor garbage can renard
living distractor iron sauterelle
living distractor ladder tomate
living prime eagle aigle
living prime pineapple ananas
living prime spider araignée
living prime ostrich autruche
living prime banana banane
living prime cactus cactus
living prime mushroom champignon
living prime dolphin dauphin
living prime squirrel écureuil
living prime elephant éléphant
living prime flower fleur
living prime giraffe girafe
living prime kangaroo kangourou
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living prime - rabbit lapin
living prime wolf loup
living prime sheep mouton
living prime bear ours
living prime paim tree palmier
living prime panda panda
living prime parrot perroquet
living prime penguin pingouin
living prime pear poire
living prime shark requin
living prime rhinoceros rhinocéros
living prime tiger tigre
living prime turtle tortue
living prime cow vache
living prime zebra zèbre
nonliving distractor alligator église
nonliving distractor ant boîte
nonliving distractor apple train
nonliving distractor artichoke tasse
nonliving distractor bee crayon
nonliving distractor beetle règle
nonliving distractor bird chaussette
nonliving distractor buffalo casque
nonliving distractor butterfly violon
nonliving distractor camel poêle
nonliving distractor carrot bague
nonliving distractor cat poubelle
nonliving distractor chicken moto
nonliving distractor com horloge
nonliving distractor deer montre
nonliving distractor dog fouet
nonliving distractor donkey brosse
nonliving distractor duck jupe
nonliving distractor fish valise
nonliving distractor flamingo collier
nonliving distractor fly cadenas
nonliving distractor fox chariot
nonliving distractor frog canapé
nonliving distractor hippopotamus bouton
nonliving distractor horse tonneau
nonliving distractor hyena poupée
nonliving distractor koala éventail
nonliving distractor lamb penderie
nonliving prime boot botte
nonliving prime screwdriver tournevis
nonliving prime - knife couteau
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nonliving prime hammer marteau
nonliving prime truck camion
nonliving prime lamp lampe
nonliving prime saw scie
nonliving prime desk bureau
nonliving prime guitar guitare
nonliving prime tractor tracteur
nonliving prime beli cloche
nonliving prime tie cravate
nonliving prime helicopter hélicoptère
nonliving prime airpiane avion
nonliving prime screw vis
nonliving prime chair chaise
nonliving prime bail ballon
nonliving prime watering arrosoir
nonliving prime basket panier
noniiving prime telephone téléphone
nonliving prime piano piano
nonliving prime rake râteau
nonliving prime fork fourchette
nonliving prime light bulb ampoule
nonliving prime candle bougie
nonliving prime comb peigne
nonliving prime glove gant
nonliving prime pyramid pyramide
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Cliapter 3: General Discussion
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Discussion
The main objective of the research carried out in this thesis was to evaluate the
hypothesis that the variables of emotional salience and semantic category would
interact with repetition priming. While studies have examined the effect of variables
including mood-relevance (Bradley et al., 1996; Challis and Krane, 1988; Danion et
al., 1995), global lexical imageability (abstract versus concrete concepts) (Jin, 1990),
age of acquisition (Barry et al., 2001), and frequency of occurrence (Forster and
Davis, 1984) on repetition priming, only a handful of studies have investigated the
effects of more meaningful variables endogenous to the to-be-remembered stimuli.
To our knowÏedge, no studies have been undertaken with the goal of establishing how
semantic category and emotional salience, two highly meaningful variables known to
influence other forms of memory, interact with priming. The studies contained
within this thesis were conducted in order to rectify this oversight, and to gamer
increasingly detailed information with respect to the neural and cognitive architecture
that underlies subliminal cross-form priming. $pecifically, two studies tested specific
hypotheses with respect to these variables: Study #1 tested whether living or
nonliving concepts would yield greater CfIP; and Study #2 tested whether items with
higher emotional salience would lead to greater CFIP. Finally, Study #3 established
that areas of the cerebral cortex which are known to participate in semantic memory
also participate in subliminal CFIP.
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This Discussion will have three parts. In the first, conclusions relative to the central
questions raised in each of the three studies will be discussed within the evolutionary
perspective. Next, the resuits reported will be discussed in the context of theoretical
models of implicit memory. Finally, conclusions will be drawn with respect to the
importance of the data regarding both the evolutionary perspective and the
conventional cognitive accounts of implicit memory.
Living-Nonliving
The hypothesis that the strength of implicit memory may be modulated in relation to
characteristics endogenous to the to-be-remembered stimuli was confirmed in Study
#1 “Semantic category effects in cross-form priming”. The central finding of this
article is that greater CFIP was obtained for living versus nonliving things. This
result is in une with the assumption that the semantic system is particularly tuned to
the identification and processing of living things as proposed by Caramazza and
Shelton (1998) and LeDoux (1996). Across the span of evolution, living things have
most probably played a much more important role in everyday life than nonliving
things. We agree with Caramazza and Shelton (1998) that this fact may have led to
the organization of brains which are particularly tuned to the perception and
categorization of living things. If living things are more salient, and if the capacity
for priming is a response to evolutionary pressures, then it follows that priming
should be more robust for living versus nonliving things, and this is exactly what was
found.
103
In the discussion of the article, a number of hypotheses were generated to account for
the enhanced strength of priming observed among living things, including an
interpretation within the sensory-functional dichotomy originally proposed by
Warrington and colleagues (Warrington and McCarthy, 1983; Warrington and
Shallice, 1984), and the supposition that increased study-phase processing and
semantic activation may have occurred for living things because they may be more
emotionally meaningful than nonliving things (Caramazza and Shelton, 199$). This
emotional salience hypothesis was one factor which motivated the research
undertaken in the second study.
Emotional valence and Arousal
The goal of Study #2, “Negative valence potentiates repetition priming” was to
test the hypothesis that greater emotional salience leads to greater CFIP. One of the
assumptions underlying this thesis is that all forms of memory exist for the same
purpose; namely, to allow the organism to leam from experience. There is ample
evidence that stimuli or events of increased emotional salience lead to greater long
term memory than relatively neutral stimuli. For example, early research found that
emotionally salient stimuli lcd to increased long-term memory formation; a so-calÏed
“reminiscence effect” (Revelle and Lofius, 1992). Although many researchers have
found both short-term detriment and long-term benefits of arousal on memory, a
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number have also found that arousal may benefit both types of leaming (Revelle and
Loftus, 1992).
The question which must be asked in the current evolutionary perspective is why
emotionally salient events would lead to improved memory. It seems reasonable to
answer this question by pointing out that events or stimuli of great emotional salience
more oflen than flot represent real world situations which could potentiaily impact on
survival. For example, many of the more highly salient and arousing (negative)
stimuli in our study depicted dangerous animais or situations of bodily mutilations,
stimuii/events which could be seen to be imperiling to survival itself. In Study #2 we
predicted that, in lune with findings obtained in studies of explicit memory, improved
CFP would be recorded in relation to emotionally salient (negative and more
arousing) versus emotionaliy neutral stimuli. The results of the study confirmed this
hypothesis. lndeed, our finding that negative but not positive emotional valence
potentiated priming is in line with the reasoning behind Caramazza and Shelton’s
(1998) hypothesis. In that conception, the very reason why items belonging to the
category of living things are more emotionally salient is based on Darwinian survival.
In order to survive, animais must avoid death, and, as such, safety is of paramount
importance. Safety can be defined as the avoidance of danger. Danger is closeiy
associated with negativity, and thus our negative stimuli may have had a greater
effect on our subjects than neutral or even positive stimuli. When faced with
something dangerous (i.e., a ferocious animal), the human must prepare (think fight
or flight), and the increased attention paid to stimuli representing threats might aid in
memory formation, both explicit and implicit (Revelle and Lofius, 1992).
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What then is the mechanism by which emotionally salient stimuli improve implicit
memory in particular? One hypothesis which lias been proposed seems to fit with the
durrent priming data. In Study #2, we discussed the notion that emotionaÏly salient
(and arousing) stimuli may gamer increased attention and processing; a “natural
selective attention” (Lang et al., 1990). Revelle and colleagues (Humphreys and
Revelle, 1984; Revelle, 1989; Revelle and Lofius, 1990) have introduced the “tick
rate hypothesis” to account for this effect. hi an analogy to the CPUs of computers,
this hypothesis posits that arousal increases the rate at which the environment is
sampled. A stimulus which is more often sampled will lead to deeper processing, to
greater semantic activation, and, hence, to enhanced CFIP. Indeed, these authors
have proposed that a high level of arousal facilitates the detection and strengthens the
retention of information. A similar way to conceive of this effect is in the context of
the levels of processing ftamework originally proposed by Craik and Lockhart
(1972). With respect to the current results, this theory would dictate that the more
salient and arousing stimuli in our study would gamer more attention and therefore be
spontaneously processed at a deeper level.
Neuronal Underpinnings
Because we were interested in leaming about the neural underpinnings of CFW, in
Study #3 “Neural Substrate of Subliminal Cross-form Priming” we used a
subliminal paradigm in the hopes of finding changes in the BOLD response which
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relate exclusively to the increase in processing efficiency for conceptually primed
items. Behaviorally, resuits suggest that the subliminal presentation of pictures can
lead to semantic activation of concepts denoted by those pictures and that these
concepts are subsequently processed more efficiently when they are repeated in their
lexical form. Importantly, the effects of this conceptual activation were measured
even thougli there was no repetition of perceptual information between study and test
items. Equally important was the fact that this activation occurred in the absence of
any possibility of explicit recali of the studied items.
This study tested the hypothesis that cortical areas which subserve semantic
processing of extemal stimuli are involved in subliminal CFIP. More specifically, we
wondered whether brain areas which are closely related to perceptual processing, or
those which participate in higher-level semantic processing, might be involved in this
form of priming. The results of the study indicated that perceptual processing areas
of the occipitotemporal cortex, which participate early on in the stream of object
processing, showed RS. An area further anterior, in the anterior lateral superior
temporal lobe, however, also showed this effect. Because these results suggest that
areas within a sernantic network involving phylogenically recent neocortical areas
play a role in CFTP, the notion that priming is a mechanism which has been
incorporated into ever-increasingly complex associative cortex is supported.
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Models of Implicit Memory
The results of this thesis support the notion that emotional salience and items from
the category of living as opposed to nonliving things both increase the strength of
repetition priming. It is important, however, to situate these resuits in the context of
contemporary models of priming. The following discussion not only attempts to
situate our results in contemporary theories but, also, evaluates these theories in light
of our data.
Priming, in the memory systems perspective, is deemed to exist solely in the service
of the identification of objects. As such, it resembles procedural memory (if
perception is seen as a skill - Tulving and Schacter, 1990; see also Gabrieli et al.’s
(1994) structural-perceptual memory system). According to Tulving and Schacter
(1990), priming effects are mediated by the PRS. The PRS (itself divided into a
visual word form, a structural description, and an auditory word form system) is
believed to 5e a hyper-specific memory system that stores information only about an
object or a word’s form but flot about its meaning (Schacter, 1992b). This conception
is able to account for perceptual priming, as may occur, for example, in
tachistoscopic identification paradigms. It does so by assuming that once an object or
a word’s form is processed, subsequent processing of the same structural form
becomes more efficient. It should be noted, however, that the theory does flot say
how this occurs. While the systems view, however, is capable of explaining
perceptual repetition priming, it has great difficulty in accounting for CFIP. By this
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view, to the extent that identity priming is a form of implicit memory, it must
implicate either the PRS or some analogous system. The presentation of a word may
indeed activate a “word form” system, and the presentation of a picture may activate
a “structural description” system, but where the systems view fails is in drawing a
link between the two. Indeed, because such sub-systems are deemed to be hyper
specific and independent, it is flot clear how the systems view is capable of
explaining the CFIP observed in our studies.
Because it explains in much more detail exactly how each module works, and how
the various modules and levels of abstraction interact, the modular memory approach
is superior to the multiple memory systems view in accounting for CFP. Both Nadel
(1994) and Moscovitch (1992) define the terms of the component modules that
comprise their systems: For Nadel, differing systems handie particular kinds of
information, perform different kinds of computations, and store the information for
differing lengths of time. For Moscovitch, the main difference between input
modules and central systems is that the output from the modules is devoid of
meaning, which is assigned at the level of central systems (which receive their input
from these modules). Within the central systems, a “semantic record” is created upon
the presentation of a meaningftul stimulus. According to the model, consciousness,
referred to as Working Memory (Baddeley, 1992), may have access to these
processes, although this is flot necessarily aiways so, as in cases where the stimulus is
perceived unconsciously. When consciousness does take place, semantically encoded
information is sent to the frontal lobe working memory system, and subsequently to
the medial temporal lobe hippocampal system. The modular approach is able to
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account for CFLP to the extent that both modules and central systems have the
property of maintenance of information. In this perspective, the semantic record
(originally instantiated by the presentation of a stimulus) is reactivated by another
stimulus with a similar (or identical) conceptual meaning, and processing efficiency
is bolstered.
Whereas the modular approach is able to account for CFW, a similar though much
more explicit explanation cornes from the “activational” perspective. In the
activational perspective, the perception of a meaningful item directly leads to
activation of the itern’s stored representation within semantic memory. This
approach is thus well suited to explaining CFIP because activity prornoted by the first
encounter with a concept is maintained long enough to aid in the processing of the
same concept the next time around — even when form is varied frorn study to test.
Morton’s (1969, 1970) iogogen model (together with its subsequent revisions)
constitutes an activational account of implicit memory (Figure 3). Activational
accounts can be opposed to the memory systems approach because in the latter, eariy
perceptual systems are assumed to be devoid of semantic information whereas the
former assumes that priming depends on such pre-existing representations. The
logogen model, originally proposed to account for word recognition, proposes the
existence of informational codes (internai representations) called “logogens” which
are stored in a “Logogen System”. A logogen is a combination of semantic, acoustic,
and visual information about a given concept. It is not a basic linguistic unit ta
morpheme) but rather an internai representation of the concept itself. In the system,
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Iogogens are defined as counting devices. They are considered to have baseline
levels of activation whose “count” can be increased by the perception of extemal
stimuli. That is, a logogen may be activated (increasing the count) by a variety of
input sources (e.g., written word, spoken word). If the count reaches a certain
threshold (or critical) value, that particular logogen is made available for (verbal)
responding. Jmportantly, the count is assumed to fall back to its baseline level quite
rapidly with time. According to the model, priming can be understood in the
following manner: Upon the presentation of a word, the count of its logogen is
increased, which lowers its relative threshold, such that a subsequent presentation
may more easily raise the activation above some critical value.
Bower’s (1986, 1996) “reactivation” model extends Morton’s (1969, 1970) Ïogogen
model and is superior in the clarity of its account of CFJP. The critical addition that
Bower makes is that logogens now also have perceptual analogs which describe
canonical versions of objects (imagens). In a “Sensory Analysis System” akin to
Biederman’s geon theory (1986, 1987), objects activate a set of geons (simple shape
primitives such as cylinders and wedges that that discriminate visual objects at a
basic level). As also proposed in Paivio’s “dual-coding” approach (Paivio, 197$;
Paivio and Begg, 1981), these geons map to imagens (the pictorial equivalent of
logogens) which map back to logogens (Figure 4). In this modèl, a mechanism is in
place to fiully account for the type of CFIP employed in this thesis: a picture is
presented and captured by a low-level Sensory Analysis System - activated geons in
tum activate an imagen - activation is transferred to the imagen’s referent logogen
thus lowering its threshold - the word is presented - due to residual activation, the
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logogen is already near its threshold - conceptual processing of the concept denoted
by the word is rendered more efficient.
Jmportantly to the present thesis, the activational perspective is able to account for
subliminal priming. Bower (1996) accounts for subliminal prirning by saying that
depending on quantity of activation, the logogen may or may not be experienced
(jerceived) consciously. Thus, in this conception, activation of a logogen is flot ail
or-none. Rather, varying levels of magnitude of activation are possible. By this
account, in subliminal priming, low-level activation is present even when no
conscious perception has occurred. A subsequent lexical decision, then, is faster if
the word refers to the same logogen (as compared to a less-activated logogen). The
activational perspective therefore is very much compatible with findings of
subliminal CFP observed in $tudy #3. Although the effects of the CFIP
manipulation may be small, a sensitive test may nevertheless be able to reveai the
effects of an unconsciously perceived stimulus.
In contrast to these models, a number oftheorists hold that all forms of memory resuit
from common mechanisms (Masson and Bodner, in press; Mayes et al., 1997;
Ratcliff and McKoon, 1988). In this perspective, ail memory phenomena are the
product ofthe episodic retention ofthe leaming episode, although such retention need
not be available to consciousness.
Motivation for this “retrospective” view cornes from the apparent failure on the part
of activational perspective to account for certain priming phenomena. For example,
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although some research has shown decay of masked priming to occur quite quickly
(Forster and Davis, 1984), it has been observed that priming effects can last for days
or weeks (e.g., Jacoby and Dallas, 1981; Mitcheli and Brown, 198$). As discussed
above, activational theories assume that the count level of a logogen (or imagen)
retums to baseline relatively quickly following stimulation, certainly within a few
minutes. Thus, the activational perspective is at a disadvantage in accounting for
very long-terni priming. Furthermore, priming has been repeatedly shown for
nonwords (Bodner and Masson, 1997; Light et al., 1995; Light et al., 1996; Masson
and Isaak, 1999; McKone and Trynes, 1999) which is difficuit to explain in the
activational perspective since in that perspective logogens must exist before priming
can occur. It is possible, however, that priming for nonwords may merely reflect
perceptual processing advantages for previously encountered letter strings.
In light of these considerations, Masson and Bodner (in press) propose that a prime
event creates a memory processing resource (or memory trace) which is accessed
upon the presentation of a target and which ultimately leads to increased processing
efficiency. Ratcliff and McKoon’s (1928, 1994) “compound-cue” theory is similar to
Masson and Bodner (in press) view in the sense that they consider that a priming
event sets-up a memory trace which is used to increase processing efficiency when a
target is presented. At test, the trace and the target are combined to create a
“compound-cue” which is a function of the match between the cue (target) and the
memory trace. To account for semantic priming, the theory suggests that instead of
activation spreading from a prime to its related target, the pre-existing relationship
between the prime and the target will be accessed by the compound-cue. The greater
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the relationship between the prime and the target in long-term rnemory the grater the
processing advantage. Accuracy and response time are determined by the
“familiarity” of the compound-cue; that is, the extent to which the two items are pre
associated in Ïong-term memory. An interpretation of CFW within this perspective,
therefore, is that the memory trace of a prime is accessed when the target is
encountered. If the prime and the target refer to the same concept, then they are
infinitely related in long-term (semantic) memory. As such, priming is expected to
occur. The resuits recorded in the current three studies, therefore, support the
compound-cue approach.
Conclusions
This thesis has accomplished a number of important goals. First, it has helped to
establish the CFJP paradigm as a viable tool for the investigation of implicit and
semantic memory. While CFIP lias been used in the current thesis to investigate
semantic category and emotional salience effects on implicit memory, further
exploitation of this technique should lead to additional knowledge regarding other
research questions in the future. Secondly, we have firmly established that emotional
salience and items from the sernantic category of living things lead to enhanced CFJP,
and by extension, implicit memory. We have seen that the activational perspective is
best suited to accounting for these results (together with those of subliminal CFIP
obtained in Study #3), and that an evolutionary perspective is able to provide a
theoretical context in which to understand them. Finally, Study #3 has shown that
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areas which participate in the semantic processing of individual items, both at a
relatively early perceptual level and further ahead in the processing stream,
participate in the increased conceptual efficiency which the paradigm of subliminal
CFIP confers. Ultimately, this thesis has supported the position that priming is a
ubiquitous phenomenon which has probably helped humans to corne this far in
evolution, and which is most certainly at play in our everyday lives.
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Figures
Figure 1
Adapted from LeDoux (1996). This figure graphically illustrates Ledoux’s
conception of a rapid neuronal system for the classification and response to
potentially dangerous animals.
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figure 2
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Three cornplementary levels of explanation in evolutionary psychology. Inferences
(represented by the arrows) can be made from one level to another. Based on
Cosmides and Tooby (1997).
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Figure 3
Logogens
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Based on Bower’s (1996) schematic representation of logogens near the logogen
“HARE”. Visual features map to lellers, and these in tum map to logogens.
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